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i
Abstract
There  is  general  consensus  that  the  reorganisation  of  production  and  labour 
processes  have  resulted  in  the  diminishing  of  a  collective  voice  at  most 
workplaces.  However,  there  is  contested  debate  on  the  possibility  of  a 
revitalisation of a labour movement whose structural power has been extensively 
undermined. This study examines potential for the establishment of new sources 
of power that may compensate for the weak trade union structural  power. The 
study uses the South Africa 2010 construction boom as a case study to explore the 
question. It adopts a qualitative research approach using interviews, participant 
observation  and  document  analysis.  The  study  affirms  earlier  studies  that 
suggested potential of new sources of power and strategies to sustain associational 
and symbolic power which may compensate for weak structural power. However, 
the study noted a  lack of consciousness or reluctance on the part  of the trade 
unions in adopting the new strategies. They instead ironically alienate self from 
the workers who constitute the majority.  The study suggests that workers have 
potential to make use of both the old and new sources of power outside the trade 
unions but in other collective forms which may be informal. The use of this power 
is not only confined to workplace struggles but can be used in other struggles 
outside the workplace. The potential of the new sources of power cannot however, 
be fully realised as long as the trade unions are oblivious of the workers who 
constitute the majority of the workforce.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Construction Industry and Trade Union Power: An Overview
The construction industry is one of the most important industries in South Africa, 
employing over one million workers and contributing an average of 3.5% to the 
Gross Domestic  Product (GDP) (Business Monitor International,  2006; Labour 
Force Survey,  2008). The industry was in a serious decline for about 30 years 
before 2003. This had been brought about by economic stagnation which had been 
initially caused by the negative impact of apartheid and later by a negative interest 
rate regime (Naidoo, 1999:15).
This  prolonged  stagnation  forced  players  in  the  industry  to  adopt  survivalist 
strategies which mainly took the form of ‘labour squeezing’. During the period of 
the decline, the industry extensively restructured, which resulted in an upsurge in 
flexible forms of employment. This was aimed at improving competitiveness by 
reducing  operating  costs  and  other  overheads  (Goldman,  2003:15). 
Competitiveness  could  be achieved by,  for  example,  transferring liability  over 
labour  legislation,  health  and  safety,  welfare  regulations,  and  other  overt  and 
covert costs to third parties such as subcontractors and labour brokers.
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Such strategies undermined the trade unions’ sources of power in the industry. As 
a result, the labour movement was almost eliminated in the industry as it lost its 
capacity to articulate and protect the workers at the workplace, despite the general 
strength  of  organised  labour  in  the  country.  Most  bargaining  councils  in  the 
industry collapsed as a result, and the majority of the workers in the industry are 
currently outside the jurisdiction of bargaining councils.
South Africa is described by many analysts as having  some of the most labour-
friendly legislation in the world as it was drawn from international best practice 
(Goldman,  2003:11).  The  legislation  in  South Africa guarantees  all  workers  a 
collective voice at the workplace, and this right is jealously protected by the South 
African Constitution. Section 26 of the Constitution guarantees every worker to 
the  right  to  form  and  join  a  trade  union;  to  participate  in  the  activities  and 
programmes of the trade union; and to strike. This is amplified in the principle 
labour statutes such as the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and the Basic Conditions 
of Employment  Act of 1997. However, these rights are under severe threat,  as 
they are stealthily slipping away from a significant proportion of the workforce.
In South Africa, the construction industry is one of the main industries where the 
collective voice for workers in the form of a trade union at the workplace is under 
severe  threat  despite  the  celebrated  labour  legislation.  This  development  is 
acknowledged  by  some  of  the  trade  unions,  who  view  this  as  a  formidable 
challenge. In response to this threat,  the strongest trade union federation in the 
country,  the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), at  its Sixth 
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National Congress in 1997 passed a resolution that recommended the merging of 
the  Construction  and  Allied  Workers  Union  (CAWU) and  National  Union  of 
Mineworkers (NUM) (COSATU, 1997). The rationale was to create synergy by 
merging  a weak affiliate  with a strong one.  At that  point  NUM had recorded 
massive successes in the mining industry and was the country’s most powerful 
and biggest trade union (Naidoo, 1999:13). This decision was therefore the best 
way to meet the challenges in the construction industry.
The successful bid by South Africa to host the Soccer World Cup in 2010, which 
coincided  with  a  massive  government  infrastructure  development  programme, 
ushered the  industry out  from the  inordinate  slump (Business  Monitor,  2006). 
Winning the bid resulted in massive construction projects such as roads, airports, 
power  stations,  port  terminals,  stadiums  and  other  projects  to  provide  the 
infrastructure  required  for  the  2010  World  Cup  as  well  as  the  government 
infrastructure development programmes. Many other projects are on the drawing 
board, and the boom is projected to last well beyond 2010 (Wiley, 2007).
As a result of the boom, employment in the industry rose from just over 200 000 
in 1998 to over one million in 2008 (Labour Force Survey,  2000, 2008). It is 
significant to note that this boom is being experienced in an industry where the 
trade union is moribund. The industry has one of the lowest levels of trade union 
density,  and  it  minimum  wage  is  only  higher  than  domestic  labour  and  the 
agriculture  industry  (Labour  Force  Survey,  2005).  Industry  conditions  are 
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worsened by the fact that the employers get construction contracts on the basis of 
the lowest bid but are in turn compensated by a very low labour cost component.
It is quite intriguing to note that in South Africa the industry is dominated by five 
conglomerates that control and account for over 70% of the business in the civil 
engineering sector.  On the consumption side, it  is ironic that  the public sector 
accounts for over 70% of the industry’s demand (Business Monitor, 2006). This 
clearly indicates that the government,  as the biggest consumer, has leverage in 
controlling the course of the industry.
The mismatch in the unprecedented boom and a moribund trade union movement 
has prompted this study with aim to explore if the labour movement can establish 
and make use of new sources of power that may result in the revitalisation of the 
labour movement in the industry.
The study examines whether the boom in the industry can establish new sources 
of power which may create  opportunities  for new organising strategies  for the 
labour movement. The research question posed in this study is: 
Can the construction boom create new sources of power which may allow for a 
possible  revitalisation  of  the  labour  movement  in  the  construction  industry  in 
South Africa?
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In order to answer the research question the study examines the following issues:
• Why are the trade unions in the construction industry in South Africa weak? 
Is this a result of the erosion of the traditional sources of trade union power?
• Are the trade unions in the construction industry making use of the traditional 
sources of power?
• Can  the  construction  boom create  new sources  of  trade  union  power?  If 
conditions for new sources of power do exist, are the trade unions making use 
of them successfully?
The study is significant because potential new sources of power and the capacity 
of trade unions to adapt and adopt new organising strategies are a prerequisite in 
organising workers in vulnerable sectors, such as construction, which are usually 
perceived as difficult  to organise. It is only those trade unions that are able to 
adopt  the  new organising  strategies  that  will  be  able  to  successfully  organise 
vulnerable  workers such as migrants,  labour-broker employees  and subcontract 
workers. 
This  study  uses  the  2010  construction  boom as  a  case  study  to  examine  the 
research question. The World Cup is one of the world’s major sporting events, 
and the success of South Africa to host these games is heavily dependent on its 
capacity to produce the infrastructure that is required for an event of such stature. 
This demands harmonious industrial relations between the parties involved in the 
delivery of such infrastructure.  This  study is  grounded on the principle  that  a 
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strong  and  effective  trade  union  is  a  must  for  the  existence  of  harmonious 
industrial relations in any industry.
1.2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
The global collapse of a Keynesian economic model in the last twenty to thirty 
years ushered in the global rise of neo-liberalism, which transformed on a global 
scale,  the  labour  relations  regime  from  a  ‘high  road’  labour  relations  that 
promoted strong trade unions, high consumption and full employment to a ‘low 
road’ labour relations that targets the enhancement and sustenance of the interests 
of the owners of capital- but attacks labour (Crotty, 2004:2).
This rise of neoliberal globalisation is closely linked to the decline in the strength 
of the labour movement. If we use trade union density as an overt measure of 
trade union strength, South Africa – which once had the fastest growth in trade 
union density – saw its trade union density decline from a high of 57.5% in 1996 
to around 34% in 2006 (Pillay cited in Bieler, Lindberg and Pillay 2008:54). 
The decline in trade union density is intimately linked to the stagnant growth of 
employment in the formal permanent  sector and the rise of the informal sector, 
where employment is atypical and the trade unions have been less successful in 
organising the workers (Naidoo, 1999:23). 
The  rise  in  atypical  forms  of  employment  is  not  positive  news  for  the  trade 
unions. Although they have made attempts to organise the workers in these forms 
of employment, they have been less successful in implementing the recommended 
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strategies (Kenny and Webster, cited in Von Holdt and Webster, 2008:350). This 
has  resulted  in  the  undermining  the  power  of  the  labour  movement,  as  this 
development inherently weakens the trade unions’ traditional sources of power.
Silver  (2003:1)  postulates  that  in  the  twenty  years  leading  to  2000 there  was 
almost  complete  consensus  in  social  science  that  the  labour  movement  was 
experiencing a severe crisis. Many analysts have attempted to predict the future of 
the labour movement, and two schools of thought have emerged. On the one hand 
are those who are optimistic about the future of the labour movement in the face 
of  neoliberal  globalisation  despite  the challenges,  while  on the other  hand are 
those who give a rather pessimistic view(Silver 2003:2). Those from the positive 
school acknowledge the challenges faced by labour but view them as temporary, 
while those who are pessimistic view them as formidable and terminal.
This part of the chapter discusses the underlying theories on trade union sources 
of power, and the potential for new sources of power and organising strategies 
which are a prerequisite for any revitalisation of the labour movement.
The labour force in any  sector is not homogeneous but segmented into various 
profiles with different rights and privileges.  Salamon (2000:6) has developed a 
typology which divides the world of work into three separate segments, each with 
distinct rights and privileges. Trade unions have to adopt different strategies to 
organise the workers in the different segments successfully. 
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Using the South African context, Von Holdt and Webster (2008:335) developed a 
typology similar to that of Salamon, segmenting the South African labour market 
into the core, the non-core and the periphery.  According to their typology,  the 
core  consists  of  jobs  that  are  stable  with  good wages,  benefits  and  access  to 
democratic representation by a trade union. In the non-core are the temporary and 
part-time jobs which are usually insecure and have poor wages and generally poor 
conditions. Employment in the non-core is said to be non-standard and there is 
very limited trade union representation. The periphery consists of the unemployed 
and those in the informal  sector where the collective voice in form of a trade 
union is almost non-existent. According to Webster and Von Holdt (2005:29), the 
trade union voice is strong in the core but diminishes as you move out towards the 
periphery.
The segmentation  of the world of  work by Salamon and later  Von Holdt  and 
Webster is very significant as it exposes the fact that workers have different rights 
and  privileges,  which  demands  that  trade  unions  adopt  different  organising 
strategies which draw power from different sources. The typology further strongly 
suggests  that  even  in  the  age  of  neoliberal  globalisation  not  all  workers  are 
victims as there are few in the core that are privileged. This applies even in cyclic 
industries such as construction. 
The construction industry is traditionally characterised by precarious and short-
term arrangements (Goldman, 2003:23). As a result the industry’s trade unions 
have traditionally been weak save for a few craft unions that existed in the early 
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days of trade unions in the country. This predicament has been worsened by the 
impact  of  neoliberal  globalisation  which  demands  extensive  flexibility  in  the 
name of shareholder value.
This study therefore examines the possibility of the trade unions in the industry 
establishing new sources of power for a possible revitalisation in the face of a 
boom. The notion of power in this context is intimately linked to and determines 
trade  union organising  strategies.  New organising strategies  are  usually  drawn 
from new sources of power or through a realignment of the sources of power. This 
may have potential in giving a new lease on life to the labour movement in the 
industry. 
According  to  the  Marxian  perspective  cited  in  Silver  (2003:18),  advanced 
capitalism does not only result in the degradation and exploitation of the working 
class but may lead to its strengthening and disposition to resist exploitation. Marx, 
as  cited  in  Silver,  viewed  advanced  capitalism –  which  this  study equates  to 
neoliberal globalisation – as weakening the marketplace power of the workers but 
conversely enhancing both the workplace bargaining and associational  powers. 
Marx identified the long-term dependence of capital on labour, which he predicted 
would result in the strengthening of the workers in the long run (Silver, 2003:19). 
According to the Marxian perspective as cited in Silver (2003), the decline of the 
labour movement must be viewed as temporary; through a realignment of power 
the  labour  movement  is  predicted  to  rise  despite  the  challenges  posed  by 
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neoliberal globalisation. Marx’s view on the future of the labour movement is the 
eminent voice from the optimistic school of thought.
Many of those who predict the future rise of the labour movement, such as Silver 
(2003:16),  use  the  double  movement  argument  by  Polanyi  in  addition  to  the 
Marxian perspective. Polanyi (1944:71) argues that money, land and labour are 
not  commodities  but  a  self-regulated  market  turns  them  into  ‘fictitious 
commodities’. He predicts that society will take measures to protect self from the 
disruption caused by the commoditisation of these fictitious commodities. Polanyi 
(1944:130) refers to this counter-movement as a ‘double movement’. The labour 
movement is, in this context, viewed as the counter-movement.
According to Silver (2003), although Marx did not use the concept of counter-
movement he nevertheless also predicted the rise of the labour movement. The 
weakness of Polanyi’s argument is that he presumed that the counter-movement 
will be spontaneous but many, such as Munck (2000), argued that the counter-
movement cannot be spontaneous but has to be created. In this context, this study 
views the  labour  movement  as  the counter-movement,  and therefore  examines 
whether a boom in the construction industry can create  an opportunity for the 
revitalisation  of  the labour  movement  in  the construction industry through the 
establishment of new sources of power and organising strategies.
Many of those who are pessimistic about the future of the labour movement argue 
that  the  rise  of  neoliberal  globalisation  is  unprecedented  and  hence  strongly 
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believe the revitalisation of the labour movement is not possible. One of them, 
Aristiden Zolberg (cited in Silver, 2003:1), argues that globalisation has resulted 
in the extinction of the working class and hence declares that there is no way the 
labour  movement  can  be  revitalised.  He  describes  the  labour  movement  as  a 
‘residual endangered species’. Similarly Castells (1996), from the same school of 
thought, argues that globalisation has created ‘non-identity movements’ which he 
claims are the only relevant movements to the period. Hence he declares trade 
unions have no place in the new order of globalisation. Castells (cited in Jilberto 
and Riethof 2002:3), claims:
  
The labour movement does not seem fit to generate by itself and 
from itself a project of identity able to reconstruct social control to 
rebuild social institutions in the information age.
Castells,  Zolberg  and many others  strongly believe  that  the  weakening  of  the 
labour  movement  is  permanent,  and  predict  that  revitalisation  is  not  possible. 
They claim neoliberal globalisation does not afford that opportunity. Taking from 
these arguments, can we therefore accept the weakening of the labour movement 
in sectors such as construction and agriculture as a permanent phenomenon?
 After  analysing  the  labour  market  globally,  Silver  (2003)  challenges  this 
assertion. She argues that the history and development of the labour movement 
globally strongly contradicts and challenges this claim. She highlights the fact that 
the labour movement is becoming stronger and very influential in the democratic 
process globally and hence should not be ruled out. Silver  (2003:58) cites  the 
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strength and success of the labour movements in the Nordic (developed) countries 
and in developing countries such as South Africa and Brazil which, according to 
her argument, cannot be judged as irrelevant even in the age of globalisation.
The possibility of a realignment of the different sources of power is significant as 
it offers an opportunity for the revitalisation of the labour movement. Different 
sources  of  power  can  be  realigned  or  articulated  and  this  has  potential  to 
rejuvenate the labour movement. The bargaining power of a trade union is derived 
from the worker/trade union sources of power.
 
Wright, cited in Silver (2003:3), makes the distinction between two main sets of 
worker sources of power – associational power and structural power. According to 
his  argument,  associational  power  is  the  power  that  is  acquired  through  the 
formation of collective organisations such as trade unions and political  parties, 
while  structural  power  is  the  power  that  workers  possess  as  a  result  of  their 
location  in  the  economic  system.  He  further  subdivides  structural  power  into 
marketplace  bargaining  power  and  workplace  bargaining  power.  Marketplace 
bargaining power, according to Wright, is the power that the workers acquire as a 
result of a tight labour market, while workplace bargaining power accrues as a 
result of the strategic location in production of a particular group of workers.
Wright’s  hypothesis  implies that  where there are high levels  of unemployment 
workers would generally have weak marketplace bargaining power; a low level of 
skilled  workers  and  a  high  level  of  unionisation  usually  denote  strong 
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associational  power.  Marketplace  bargaining  power  has  been  weakened  by 
globalisation, as this phenomenon has merged the world labour markets such that 
now all workers across the globe compete for the same job. Silver (2003) argues 
that associational power is historically embedded in the state legal framework, but 
the sovereignty of the state has been weakened by the hyper mobility of capital 
propelled by neoliberal  globalisation.  This, she argues, has undermined worker 
associational power as trade unions are still largely confined to nation states while 
capital is now global. Additionally, capital compared to labour is relatively more 
easily able to move globally. Labour still faces many barriers to movement across 
borders.
 The  post-Fordist  era  has  seen  the  reorganisation  of  production  and  labour 
processes. This has made most production processes dependent, which in turn has 
weakened workplace bargaining power (Silver, 2003:14). Wright further argues 
that  globalisation  weakens  both  structural  and  associational  powers,  which 
ironically are the traditional trade union sources of power.
In the South African context globalisation has opened up the South African labour 
market,  which has resulted in  an influx of migrant  labour  from other  parts  of 
Africa and beyond.  This has resulted in the weakening of worker marketplace 
bargaining power. This has a knock-on effect as it in turn weakens associational 
power. For example, the opening of the labour market attracts vulnerable workers 
such as migrant workers who are usually ‘resistant’ to the traditional forms of 
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organising  normally  engaged  in  by  trade  unions.  This  then  weakens  worker 
associational power.
Making a contribution on the discourse on new sources of power for workers, Von 
Holdt and Webster (2008) acknowledge the severe structural  weakening of the 
labour movement by using South African case studies of workers in vulnerable 
forms of employment usually perceived as ‘unorganisable’. They expand Silver’s 
argument by bringing in the concept of symbolic power drawing from Fine (2006) 
and Chun (2006) (both cited in Von Holdt and Webster, 2008). Fine and Chun 
identified the importance of moral power using undocumented migrants who had 
very limited structural power. According to their argument, moral power involves 
recasting workers’ struggles as struggles of right or wrong. Chun (2006, cited in 
Von Holdt and Webster, 2008:337) uses the concept of symbolic leverage which 
involves  drawing  from  an  intersection  between  exploitation  and  social 
discrimination.
 The highlighting of social discrimination and exploitation does not appeal only to 
the workers who are the victims, but also to their communities. According to the 
argument by Von Holdt and Webster, symbolic power is power that is constituted 
in the public sphere; it is based on the images and ideas which are connected to 
community and public  consciousness,  and emphasises  social  and citizen rights 
and  not  only  workers’  rights.  In  the  construction  industry,  it  is  clear  that  the 
traditional  sources  of  power  are  traditionally  weak  and  have  further  been 
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undermined. The workers can therefore articulate their associational power with 
the symbolic power, and this may provide new sources of power.
Von Holdt and Webster (2008:351) argue that, to compensate for the erosion of 
worker  structural  power,  there  is  need  for  a  concerted  effort  that  commits 
resources which develop new associational strategies that recognise the potential 
of  symbolic  power.  According  to  their  argument,  the  labour  movement  can 
articulate associational power with symbolic power which may compensate for 
the loss in structural power, and this may provide a new source of power. This 
realignment of power has the potential  to revitalise the labour movement.  Von 
Holdt  and  Webster  (2008:351)  declared  that  the  challenges  facing  the  labour 
movement may not be inventible as there are opportunities for new associational 
strategies and new kinds of collective power which compensate for the loss of 
structural power by articulating symbolic power to associational power.
A number  of other studies reinforce the argument  by Von Holdt and Webster 
(2008).  Clawson  (2003)  acknowledges  a  general  steep  decline  in  trade  union 
membership, power and public perception, but nevertheless predicts an upsurge of 
the labour movement, basing his argument on research on the American labour 
movement. The upsurge as predicted by Clawson is not going to be spontaneous, 
according to his argument, but is conditional on the labour movement inventing 
new organising strategies such as forming alliances with social movements.
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Silver  (2003:16)  argues  that  the  slogan  of  the  neoliberals  –  that  there  is  no 
alternative – has a powerful effect in demobilising organised labour, as workers 
traditionally believe that they have the power on which they have been mobilised 
in the past. According to her argument, globalisation has ‘punctured’ this belief. 
Could the labour movement be weakened just by this slogan?
One of  the  underlying  factors  for  the  future  survival  and  revitalisation  of  the 
labour movement is its capacity to invent and adopt new organising strategies, 
according to Sherman and Voss (2000:84). They propose three conditions that 
work in combination to facilitate the innovation of new organising strategies for 
trade unions. The three conditions are: the need for the trade union to realise that 
it  is in a crisis for survival;  support from an international partner; or the trade 
union  may  have  a  union  staff  activist  within  its  ranks  attached  to  the  social 
movements who may lead the innovation. In South Africa many trade unionists 
are closely linked to social movements.
Sherman  and  Voss  (2000)  used  case  studies  from  the  American  trade  union 
federation, AFL-CIO and its affiliates to argue that vulnerable workers such as 
migrant  workers  are  organisable  but  only  through  the  use  of  confrontational 
strategies  that  utilise  rank-and-file  organising  strategies.  According  to  their 
argument,  these  strategies  are  very  successful,  despite  employer  resistance,  as 
they emphasise worker participation and make use of pressure from other power 
bases usually outside the workplace. This involves the use of corporate campaign 
strategies which involve tactics focused on expanding the arena of the conflict 
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beyond the point of production, where trade union campaigns have traditionally 
been  centred.  The  power  base  outside  the  workplace  argument  referred  to  by 
Sherman and Voss is equivalent of the symbolic power argument by Von Holdt 
and Webster (2008). The workers involved in the construction of 2010 stadiums 
can, for example, take their struggle away from the workplace to the soccer fans 
and recast their struggle as a struggle of right or wrong.
Clawson (2003:187) concurs with Sherman and Voss as he argues that workers in 
vulnerable  sectors  can  be  organised  by  ‘taking  the  struggle  beyond  the 
workplace’.  He uses the case study of a university students’  campaign against 
sweat shops on behalf of vulnerable workers, and argue this has potential to work 
as  a  new  source  of  power  for  the  vulnerable  workers.  However,  Clawson’s 
argument is rather ambivalent, as he questions whether this form of campaign can 
be  a  form  of  empowerment  or  whether  it  is  paternalism,  as  it  removes 
responsibility  and  control  from  the  people  most  concerned.  However,  he 
nevertheless  views this  model  as the probable future organising model  for the 
labour movement.
The  new organising  strategies  which  include  the  use  of  civil  disobedience  to 
attract  the media, marches, demonstrations and creation of coalitions with other 
community groups draws power from new sources, but for them to be effective it 
is necessary to use multiple tactics simultaneously (Sherman and Voss, 2000:81). 
The  upsurge  predicted  by  Clawson  (2003)  demands  that  trade  unions  bring 
workers together to form alliances with other social movements and groups.
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Lopez, (2004:9) concurs, but adds that social movement unionism goes beyond 
traditional  routine  forms  of  organising  such  as  strikes  to  organised  collective 
campaigns  emphasising  public  protest  and  other  disruptive  tactics  that  build 
workers’  confidence  and  their  sense  of  collective  power.  Lopez  (2004:11) 
expands the  debate  by arguing  that  social  movement  trade  unions  frame  their 
demands politically and not just on narrow labour market goals as they seek to 
build genuine labour-community coalitions. 
Lopez  further  identifies  strategies  that  can  be  used  by  trade  unions  in  an 
environment  where  there  is  an  anti-trade-union  culture.  These  are:  the  use  of 
internal, community and corporate campaigns and community organising which 
involves, for example, demonstrations at parliament and political meetings. Lopez 
also  emphasises  the  use  of  symbolic  and  moral  power.  He  argues  that  these 
strategies  have  a  cumulative  effect  as  they  reinforce  one  another.  Lopez, 
(2004:20) acknowledges the fact that globalisation has closed doors for organised 
labour, but argues that it has opened other opportunities. He argues that capital 
has some weaknesses which the labour movement can exploit.
A boom in any industry logically results in the enhancement of worker bargaining 
power.  Milkman  and  Wong  (2000:170)  use  the  case  of  the  America  labour 
movement in the construction industry after the World War 2 to support this view. 
According to their argument, by 1950 California had one of the most powerful 
and well-organised trade unions in America, which had recovered as a result of a 
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boom in the industry. However, Fisk, Mitchell and Erickson (2000:200) argue that 
not all booms are associated with trade union revitalisation. They use a case study 
of a massive office boom which was accompanied by a massive de-unionisation 
and decline in the power of the trade unions. Their case study suggests there can 
be a negative realignment of power which can result in the weakening of the trade 
union  –  symbolic  power  in  reverse.  Therefore,  the  current  boom  in  the 
construction industry in South Africa does not guarantee the revitalisation of the 
trade unions in the industry as it may even weaken them.
The identification and distinction of workers’ sources of power is important, as 
the  source  of  power  determines  the  mobilisation  and  organisational  strategies 
which the trade union may engage. Weak workplace and labour market bargaining 
power can be compensated for by associational power or through realignment or 
articulation with symbolic power. Instead of adopting strategies that draw from 
marketplace  and  workplace  bargaining  power,  vulnerable  workers  such  as 
migrants can be organised based on new associational power that recognises the 
potential of symbolic power and develops community-based strategies which may 
involve  the  creation  of  alliances  with  church-based  organisation,  migrant 
organisations and non-governmental  organisations (NGOs). The workers in the 
construction industry in South Africa can be organised through an appeal to the 
public  sense  of  social  justice  by,  for  example,  highlighting  the  levels  of 
exploitation in the industry.
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This study seeks to establish whether a construction boom offers an opportunity 
for  trade  unions  in  the  industry  to  draw power  from the  new sources  and to 
develop new organising strategies that recognise that the struggle can be moved 
away from the workplace and still be won.
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Chapter Two
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
2.1 Introduction
The focus of this study is to examine whether a boom in the construction industry 
creates  new sources  of  power for  trade  unions  in  the construction  industry in 
South Africa which may enable them to adopt new organising strategies that are 
key  for  their  revitalisation.  This  chapter  discusses  the  methods  employed  to 
explore the research question, as well as the limitations and ethical issues.
2.2 The Selection of Research Sites
The study used the 2010 stadium construction projects to examine the research 
question, and adopted qualitative research methods. Three construction projects 
were  selected  for  this  study out  of  a  total  of  ten  2010  stadium constructions 
projects throughout the country.
Five of the ten 2010 stadium construction projects are new stadiums while the 
others are major renovations. The study initially intended to include at least five 
of  the  projects  where  massive  construction  was  in  progress:  Johannesburg, 
Polokwane, Nelspruit, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth. However, due to 
time and financial  constraints,  this  could not be achieved.  The study therefore 
sampled all the projects, and purposefully selected three sites for more in-depth 
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study.  The  sites  were  selected  on  the  basis  of  heterogeneity  so  as  to  capture 
variations.
The following sites were finally selected: Soccer City stadium in Johannesburg, 
Green Point Stadium in Cape Town, and Mbombela stadium in Nelspruit.  The 
Green Point stadium construction is the only 2010 stadium construction project 
where  the  terms  and conditions  of  employment  are  governed by a  bargaining 
council constituted in terms of section 27 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995.The 
other projects are regulated by a Ministerial sectoral determination promulgated in 
terms of section 56 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997. Nelspruit 
stadium was selected as it was reported to have recorded the highest number and 
most violent industrial actions before this study commenced. Soccer City stadium 
in Johannesburg is  the only 2010 construction  project  at  which the terms  and 
conditions of employment are regulated by a recognition agreement, which is akin 
to a project labour agreement, in addition to the Minister sectoral determination. 
This agreement is a site-specific collective bargaining agreement that  regulates 
industrial relations and other terms and condition of employment. Additionally, 
Soccer City was reported to be the only 2010 project that had not recorded an 
industrial action before this study commenced.
The focus of this study is the trade unions and the workers in the construction 
industry in South Africa. However, the trajectory of trade unions and workers is 
usually shaped by other actors who for this reason were also included as subjects 
of this study. In examining trade union sources of power and organising strategies, 
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the study therefore also focused on the perception of management, government 
and the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), all of 
whom play a critical role in shaping trade union power.
This study was conducted between June and December 2008. During this period 
the  researcher  was  attached  to  the  National  Union  of  Mineworkers-National 
Organising Department (Construction) in Johannesburg.
2.3 Qualitative Research Methods
2.3.1 The value of qualitative methods 
The study adopted a qualitative research methodology as this allows an in-depth 
understanding of trade union sources of power and organising strategies. The aim 
of  the  study  is  to  gain  a  rich  and  detailed  description  of  the  individual 
understanding of their social world which can only be achieved through the use of 
qualitative  methods  (Neuman,  2000).  In  addition,  qualitative  research  methods 
assist the researcher to understand the life of individuals or groups studied in their 
own frame of reference, and offer an opportunity to make an interpretation which 
reflects  the interviewee’s account (Lemmer,  1992). The aim of this study is to 
gain  an  intimate  understanding  of  the  beliefs,  understanding,  ideas  and 
experiences of the workers and the trade unions in the 2010 construction projects 
and  how these  relate  to  trade  union  sources  of  power.  This  can  be  achieved 
through qualitative research methods.
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 The  research  made  use  of  a  triangulation  of  measures  through  the  use  of 
interviews  (in-depth,  semi-structured  and  group),  document  analysis  and 
participant observation. The triangulation of measures allowed the researcher to 
view the same phenomenon from several angles and hence gave the researcher a 
better understanding of the problem (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:125). Interviews 
were  used  as  the  main  research  instrument,  supplemented  by observation  and 
document analysis.
2.3.2 Interviews
2.3.2.1 In-depth interviews
 In-depth interviews were conducted with representatives from the trade unions, 
employers, government and the CCMA. At the trade unions, they were conducted 
with the national co-ordinators and the regional organisers of NUM and BCAWU, 
which are the two trade unions represented in the 2010 projects. At least one of 
the main contractor’s Human Resources Manager/ Industrial Relations Manager at 
the selected sites was interviewed. The Industrial Relations Manager of the South 
African Federation for Civil Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC), the Executive 
Manager Collective Bargaining in the Department of Labour and the Executive 
Director of the Cape Building Bargaining Council were all interviewed through 
this method. The Building and Woodworkers International (BWI) 2010 Campaign 
Co-ordinator  based  in  Cape  Town  at  the  Labour  Research  Service  was  also 
interviewed in depth.
24
A total of 18 in-depth interviews were conducted. Most of them were conducted 
in private offices, usually the offices of the interviewees. As the interviews were 
in-depth, there was no restriction on the way they were conducted; rather, they 
were aimed at giving the interviewees an opportunity to express their experience 
from their own frame of reference. The focus of the interviews was to infer and 
make an opinion based on the response on trade union sources of power and new 
organising strategies. Almost all the interviews were recorded, but only with the 
consent of the interviewee. In addition to recording the interviews, the researcher 
also  compiled  some  notes  in  a  notebook.  In  the  few  circumstances  where 
recording  an  interview  was  declined  comprehensive  notes  were  taken  and 
immediately when an opportunity arose the researcher compiled a detailed report 
of the interview. 
2.3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews
At each of the selected sites, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the 
shop steward or senior shop steward. The researcher used an interview schedule 
as a discussion guide but allowed the respondents to share their experience from 
their  own  frame  of  reference.  This  allowed  more  flexibility  for  probing  and 
discussion. It was through these interviews that the researcher was able to gain a 
profound understanding of the daily routines and power structures at each of the 
case studies (Kvale, 1996). In interviewing the shop stewards the researcher took 
note of their ambivalent role as they represent the interests of the trade union and 
that  of  management  simultaneously.  This  was  apparent  during  some  of  the 
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interviews. The interviews with the shop stewards clearly exposed the organising 
challenges and opportunities that the trade unions are facing in the construction 
industry in general.
 
In addition to the three selected sites, the researcher had the opportunity to meet 
some shop stewards from Polokwane and Durban who came to Johannesburg on 
union business. He decided to interview them using semi-structured interviews to 
get a clearer understanding of the dynamics of industrial action, a phenomenon 
that was common at most of the sites. A total of five semi-structured interviews 
were conducted.
2.3.2.3  Focus group interviews
Eight to ten workers were selected at each of the visited sites using convenient 
sampling  methods.  The  researcher,  with  the  assistance  of  the  shop  steward, 
ensured that the convenient sample was as representative as possible to reflect the 
heterogeneous  workforce  at  each  of  the  sites.  To  ensure  the  samples  were 
representative enough, workers from various categories were included – limited 
duration contract,  permanent (core), subcontracted, labour-broker and any other 
category of workers that may be represented at any of the sites. At all the sites, 
time to conduct the interviews was very limited due to tight stadium construction 
deadlines, such that it was almost impossible to convene a group of ten employees 
for an interview during normal  working hours. As a result  all  the focus group 
interviews had to be conducted during the lunch break at each of the sites.
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The focus  group interviews  proved to  be very significant  as  they allowed the 
participants to come together to share and create meaning among themselves as a 
group rather than as individuals, as argued by Kvale (1996). This method gave the 
researcher an opportunity to observe interactions of a number of people on a given 
subject, and this enabled the researcher to evaluate similarities and differences in 
the participants’  opinions and experience (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). In Cape 
Town, for example, this method exposed the fact that a significant number of the 
ordinary  workers  could  not  differentiate  between  the  trade  unions  and  the 
bargaining council. A total of three focus group interviews were conducted; one at 
each of the selected sites.
2.3.3 Observation
This involves observation and participation by the researcher in the current social 
setting  of  the subject  which the researcher  wants  to  penetrate  and learn about 
(Neumann, 2000).The opportunity given to the researcher to be attached to the 
main  construction  trade  union  in  the  country  gave  the  researcher  an  intimate 
understanding of the day-to-day trade union campaign activities and strategies. 
The National Union of Mineworkers was selected as it is the biggest trade union 
in  the  industry,  and  it  represents  the  largest  number  of  workers  in  the  2010 
stadium construction projects. However, a substantial portion of this attachment 
period  was  also  committed  to  the  Building,  Construction  and Allied  Workers 
Union, which is the second largest and oldest trade union in the industry.
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Permission  for  access  was  granted  by  the  NUM  national  executive  and  the 
BCAWU Secretary General after the request was made to the respective executive 
committees of the two trade unions. During the period of attachment at the trade 
unions, the researcher had an opportunity to be attached to the senior shop steward 
at each of the sites selected, for an average of at least one week at each site.
As a participant observer, the researcher was actively involved in the day-to-day 
union campaign activities, especially those aligned to organising. This afforded 
the researcher  an opportunity to attend  trade union site meetings,  conferences, 
workshops and many other union meetings and functions. During these meetings 
and workshops the researcher took some notes in a notebook, which were then 
used to compile a report at the end of each function or activity.
Participant  observation  enabled  the  researcher  to  have  access  to  the  different 
levels of the trade unions, and this gave the researcher a better understanding of 
the relationships and roles between the different levels of the unions (Neuman, 
2000).  The  researcher  was  able  to  interact  with  people  from different  levels, 
experiences and aspirations. This method exposed information on internal conflict 
and  the  relationship  between  the  union  staff  and  membership.  Participant 
observation  enabled  the  researcher  to  take  full  account  of  the  events  as  they 
transpired, as argued by Neuman (2000). The method supplemented the findings 
from interviews by enabling the researcher to have a better understanding of the 
findings. This method allowed the researcher to fully understand for example, the 
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ambivalent role played by the shop steward, which was apparent at some of the 
selected sites.
2.3.4 Documentary analysis
An extensive analysis of documents was conducted, drawing from both official 
and unofficial documents. The trade unions were very supportive as they provided 
the  researcher  with  union  documents:  reports,  minutes,  policy  documents, 
memoranda,  congress  reports  and  resolutions,  and  many  other  relevant 
documents.  The  researcher  was  granted  access  to  the  Department  of  Labour 
archives  and  managed  to  access  some  relevant  documents  and  collective 
bargaining agreements. Some documents were accessed through the Internet from 
the respective organisations’ websites.
In  analysing  the  documents  the  researcher  took  note  of  the  fact  that  some 
documents  may omit  some information  or  may be  distorted,  which  may raise 
some  questions  with  no  immediate  answers.  Only  the  documents  with  some 
relevance to the study question were analysed.
2.4 Access and Ethical Considerations
All participants in this research were selected on a voluntary basis. They were all 
advised of their right to decline taking part in the study or not to answer certain 
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questions  (Babbie  and  Mouton,  2001). According  to  Burton  (2000),  in  any 
research co-operation must be voluntary and the respondents must be advised in 
advance that it is within their rights to refuse to answer certain questions or not to 
take part if they feel so. This argument by Burton (2000) guided this research. 
One  interviewee,  for  example,  wanted  clarification  on  the  significance  of  the 
research, which was explained before the interview was conducted.
Getting  access  to  a  research  site  is  one  of  the  major  challenges  faced  by  a 
researcher. Neuman, (2000) argues that a researcher may find that he or she is not 
welcome  or  allowed  at  a  site.  In  this  study  the  researcher  did  not  face  any 
significant challenge to accessing the research sites as he was attached to the main 
trade union which had almost unlimited access to all the sites in question.
The researcher observed that some of the respondents were apprehensive despite 
having  volunteered  to  take  part  in  the  study.  The  researcher  guaranteed  the 
confidentiality  of  all  participants  by  assuring  them  that  all  the  information 
collected  would  be  kept  anonymous  and  confidential  and  used  for  academic 
purpose  only.  To dispel  nervousness  and suspicion,  the  researcher  briefed  the 
participants on the rationale of the study, the procedure being followed and how 
the information collected was to be used. The researcher volunteered to answer 
any questions and queries regarding the study from each and every respondent.
2.5 Strengths, Weaknesses and Problems in the Field
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The study acknowledges that the different research instruments used in this study 
had  some  limitations.  In  order  to  minimise  the  weaknesses  of  the  research 
instruments  used,  the  researcher  made  use  of  a  triangulation  of  methods 
(interviews, documents and participation observation). This allowed the extension 
of the strengths of each instrument and limited the weaknesses.
The literacy level  of the workforce in the construction industry is very low, and 
this proved to be a challenge for the study as some of the workers had a very 
limited command of the English language. The researcher’s proficiency in Zulu 
and Ndebele  (two of  the  main  local  indigenous  languages)  proved to  be  very 
essential and critical during some of the interviews. In a few cases the participants 
were  only  fluent  in  languages  other  than  English,  Zulu  and  Ndebele;  the 
researcher managed to get translation from the union officials, shop stewards or 
other workers where necessary.
The  research  was  conducted  with  a  very  limited  budget  and  as  a  result  the 
researcher  faced some financial  constraints.  The researcher ended up requiring 
more time to conduct all the interviews than was initially planned due to some 
last-minute postponement of some of the interviews. 
The  research  was  conducted  during  the  period  June  to  December  2008,  and 
initially targeted all the 2010 stadium construction projects in the country. Time 
and financial constraints forced the researcher to purposively select only the three 
sites which are the focus of this study. However, the researcher interviewed the 
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shop  stewards  at  Polokwane  and  Durban  stadiums  mainly  for  the  purpose  of 
gaining a wider understanding of the industrial  actions.  The researcher  had an 
opportunity to  meet  these officials  in  Johannesburg when they came on union 
business, and had to make a last-minute decision to include them.
At one of the selected sites, one human resources manager declined to take part in 
the  study,  as  he was suspicious  about  the  motives  of  the research  despite  the 
researcher  giving  assurances  about  confidentiality  and  an  explanation  on  the 
research rationale.
2.6 Limitations of the Study
This study makes a contribution on the discourse on new trade union sources of 
power, but it has some limitations. There are at least five trade unions organising 
in the construction industry in South Africa. This study only focused on two, and 
this clearly limits the scope of the study. The researcher had expected to find all 
the trade unions organising in the construction industry in the 2010 projects but 
was surprised to discover that only two trade unions were organising a significant 
proportion of the workforce in the projects.
Chapter Three
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REGIMES AND TRADE UNIONS
3.1 The Construction Industry in South Africa 
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The construction industry in South Africa is a collective name for the building and 
civil  engineering  contracting  industries  (Hauptfleisch  and  Sigle,  2000:1). The 
building  industry  is  involved  with  the  construction  of  buildings  and  the  civil 
engineering industry with the construction of engineering structures such as dams, 
bridges, pipelines and other related structures.
The government plays a dual role – as the industry regulator which makes policies 
and regulations, and as the industry’s single biggest consumer (Hauptfleisch and 
Sigle,  2000).  The  government  has  identified  the  industry  as  a  channel  for 
achieving its socio-economic objectives of poverty reduction and infrastructure 
development  as  it  has  leverage  to  influence  the  course  of  the  industry 
(Construction Industry Development  Board [CIDB],  2004).  The Department  of 
Public Works (DPW) summarised the objectives of the construction industry as 
follows:
 A construction industry policy and strategy that promotes stability, 
fosters  economic  growth  and  international  competitiveness  and 
creates sustainable employment and addresses historic imbalances 
as  it  generates  new  industry  capacity  for  industry  development 
(DPW, 1998:1).
These  objectives  are  in  line  with  government  pro-Keynesian  macroeconomic 
policy which targets the expansion of aggregate demand and employment creation 
as the key drivers of national development. Government views the industry as an 
agent  of development,  as investment  in the industry has a multiplier  effect  on 
downstream industries.
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The construction industry is a highly fragmented industry as it comprises many 
separate role-players performing different functions, and is cyclical in nature as a 
result  of  economic  variables  (Hauptfleisch  and  Sigle,  2000).  The  industry  is 
highly dependent on the general economic environment and performance of other 
sectors of the economy. These characteristics heightens the need for flexibility. 
Therefore, the industry extensively adopted flexible forms of employment such as 
the use of labour brokers, casual labour, sub-contractors and other flexible forms 
of employment to maximise profit.
The successful bid by South Africa to host the 2010 Soccer World Cup came at a 
time  when the  industry  had  been  in  survivalist  mode  for  over  three  decades. 
Hence the industry generally was not investing in skills development (Business 
Monitor International, 2006). The survivalist mode also perpetuated the existence 
of a weak trade union movement in the industry. 
As the trade unions in the sector were almost moribund, the government and the 
employers  made no special dispensation on how industrial relations in the 2010 
construction projects was to be managed (Interview, NUM National Co-ordinator 
Construction, 19 August 2008). For the government and building contractors it 
was business as usual, and they treated it as they would any other construction 
project. On the other hand, the workers and the trade unions felt otherwise. This 
difference in perception had a tremendous impact on the industrial relations in the 
construction of the 2010 projects.
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From the onset there was confusion in determining which sector was responsible 
for  the  projects  –  building  engineering  or  construction.  This  classification  is 
significant as it determines the relevant applicable industrial relations regime.
3.2 Profile of the Workforce
3.2.1 Overview
The volatility and cyclical nature of the construction industry demands the use of 
flexible forms of employment (Hauptfleisch and Sigle, 2000). This has resulted in 
the segmentation of the workforce in the industry in conformity with the Von 
Holdt  and  Webster  (2008)  typology.  The  workforce  in  the  2010  stadium 
construction projects is segmented into permanent (core) staff, limited-duration 
contract  (LDC)  workers,  sub-contractors  and  labour-broker  workers.  These 
workers have different rights and privileges.
An understanding of this distinction is critical for trade unions as it determines 
how these different workers can be organised and where they draw their power. 
The latest developments have seen the construction becoming a ‘sanctuary’ for 
migrant workers from neighbouring countries and the region, the majority of who 
are  illegal  -in  light  of  the  political  crisis  in  Zimbabwe.  This  adds  another 
dimension to the profile of workers in the industry in South Africa. 
3.2.2 Permanent staff (core staff)
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The study observed that at all the sites used in this study all the main contractors 
confirmed having a core staff employed on a permanent basis, but constituting a 
small proportion of the total workforce. The core workers are usually semi skilled 
and  skilled  workers  such  as  tractor  drivers  and  grader  operators.  One  of  the 
employers explained:
We cannot look for all types of skills each time we get a contract. 
We have to keep a core staff that we can quickly mobilise when we 
get a contract. We cannot always look for grader operators or tractor 
drivers  every  time  we  get  a  contract  as  these  are  highly  skilled 
personnel which we may not find easily on the job market, if we try 
to gamble. They constitute part of our core staff and we move with 
them from one project to the other (Interview, Human Resources 
Manager, Nelspruit Stadium, 28 October 2008).
These  workers  have  a  permanent  contract  of  employment  which  usually  is  of 
indefinite  duration.  They normally have benefits  such as pension,  medical  aid, 
housing, transport allowances and others. This is the group that usually enjoys the 
right to representation by a trade union. This is confirmed by the fact that despite 
constituting an average of less than 30% of the total workforce the group still 
makes up the majority of the trade union members- over 80%. In addition, most of 
those making up the structures and leadership of the trade union are from this 
group. 
One  manager  described  this  group  of  workers  as  the  privileged  class  of  the 
industry; a position which the trade union leadership accepted (Interview, Human 
Resources Manager Cape Town,12 August 2008; Interview, NUM National Co-
ordinator Construction,19 August 2008). These workers are the most active in all 
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trade union activities,  and it is not a surprise that  most trade union organising 
strategies are designed for them. At some projects they are the only ones eligible 
to be elected as shop stewards and to hold posts in other union structures.
The other categories of workers who are not permanent have a general feeling that 
the permanent workers are favoured by the employer. One complained:
I do the same job with someone who is permanent and I get R12 an 
hour while he gets R18, and in addition he will  get  housing and 
transport allowances and my only ‘reward’ is that at the end of the 
project  my contract  will  be terminated  while  he is  transferred to 
another project. This is not fair at all …. (Interview, Construction 
Worker Nelspruit Stadium, 29 October 2008).
3.2.3 Limited-duration contract employees
LDC  employees  are  workers  whose  contract  of  employment  is  fixed  to  the 
duration  of  the  work  to  be  performed  or  to  a  specific  duration.  There  is  no 
standard on the duration of the contract,  as it  may be for a few days  or for a 
number  of years depending on the project  or agreement.  The employer  has no 
obligation to give the employee notice at the end of the contract.
In the 2010 projects, these workers’ contracts were usually tied to the completion 
of  the  stadium.  They  may  be  employed  by  the  main  contractor  or  by  a 
subcontractor. Most of these workers are usually drawn from the local community 
in  compliance  with  the  government  recruitment  policy,  which  obliges  public 
construction projects to recruit from the local community with an aim to alleviate 
poverty and create employment.
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It was interesting to note that this form of employment has a history linked to the 
apartheid regime. This was revealed during some of the interviews with the senior 
shop stewards. Prior to the 1979 recommendations by the Wiehahn Commission, 
black workers were not classified as employees and hence were not covered by 
the country’s labour legislation. This provided what Von Holdt (1997:132) refers 
to as the ‘convenience of apartheid’, as employers could hire black workers as 
casual  workers  without  sanction  from the  government  as  the  blacks  were  not 
classified as employees. After the Wiehahn Commission recommended that black 
workers enjoy workers’ rights as in the conventions of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the use of casual labour was sanctioned by legislation. 
To continue enjoying the ‘convenience’ of apartheid the industry developed this 
type of employment contract, now popularly referred to in industry circles as the 
Limited  Duration  Contract.  Hence,  according  to  the  trade  unions,  LDC 
employment  is  as  a  perpetuation  of  the  apartheid  legacy and this  still  has  an 
impact on the way the trade unions organise in the industry (Interview, Senior 
Shop Steward, Soccer City Stadium, 17 September 2008).
The LDC workers enjoy very limited rights and privileges which are inferior to 
those of the core staff. They offer the convenience because the employer does not 
have  to  give  notice  at  the  end  of  a  project  or  pay  a  retrenchment  package 
(Interview, NUM National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008). The trade 
unions confessed that it is difficult to organise these workers due to the nature of 
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their  contracts  that  are  tied to a project.  The trade unions have not  been very 
successful  in  organising  and  recruiting  these  workers  into  their  structures 
(Interview, BCAWU National Co-ordinator, 26 August 2008). One shop steward 
lamented:
We try to  organise these workers  but  with very limited  success. 
They will tell you they are just employed for the project and hence 
they see no need to join the union. They see the union as belonging 
to those who are on permanent  contract.  We still  try to organise 
them but  we are  losing  the  war  (Interview,  senior  shop steward 
Polokwane, 20 August 2008).
 
Ironically, while the trade unions are failing to successfully organise them, most 
of the contractors are using more and more workers in this category, citing the 
volatility in the industry .One of the managers remarked:
The industry is unpredictable and hence we only depend on a few 
core  permanent  staff,  and  for  the  majority  of  the  work  we  use 
LDCs, labour brokers or subcontractors. This makes it flexible for 
us as the main contractors, as when we do not have any work we 
would not be stuck with workers we cannot pay (Interview, Human 
Resources Manager Cape Town, 12 August 2008).
The  workers  on  limited  duration  contracts  may  be  employed  by  the  main 
contractor, labour brokers or subcontractors, as was observed at all the sites used 
in this study.
3.2.4 Labour broker workers
This form of employment also evolved as a result of the demand for flexibility in 
the industry. Employment in the construction industry is overwhelmingly casual 
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in nature, characterised by subcontracting and other flexible forms of employment 
(Kajimo–Shakantu and Root, (2004:48). Labour brokers are third parties who are 
usually  hired  by  the  main  contractors  or  subcontractors  to  provide  labour. 
Although the workers work for the main contractor  or subcontractor’s  project, 
they are nevertheless not employed by him but by the labour broker. The labour 
broker signs a commercial contract to provide labour to the main contractor and 
assumes the role of being the employer. Through this arrangement the contractors 
are able to evade the obligations imposed by labour legislation. 
The  labour  brokers  make  their  profit  by  charging  a  mark  up  for  the  service- 
paying less to the workers. As a result of the need to maximise profit,  labour-
broker workers are exposed to very poor conditions. During this study it was easy 
to  see  a  distinction  between  the  labour-broker  employees  and  the  permanent 
employees.  The labour-broker  workers  were conspicuous as they were usually 
having worn-out  overalls  and protective  clothing,  which was a  contrast  to  the 
permanent core staff. 
The  study established  that  very  few workers  in  this  category  are  trade  union 
members. At one of the stadiums, one of the shop stewards lamented how difficult 
it is for the trade unions to organise workers in this category:
We try to assist them if they are being exploited but the problem is 
we do not know where these guys come from. We just see them 
here as they come in and out and usually for very brief periods. We 
try to assist them join the trade union but they fear victimisation by 
the  employers,  hence  they  stay  as  far  away  from  the  union  as 
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possible  (Interview,  Shop  Steward  Cape  Town,  24  September 
2008).
The  use  of  this  form  of  employment  is  so  prevalent  that  it  was  a  common 
phenomenon at all the sites used in this study. Most of the labour brokers provide 
labour of varying skills, from unskilled labour up to highly skilled workers such 
as artisans.
It was apparent that most of the labour brokers have some strong links with the 
main contractors, raising the suspicion that some may even be subsidiaries of the 
main contractors:
We suspect that our management might be having some shares in 
some  of  these  labour  brokers  because  we always  work  with  the 
same labour brokers from one project to the next, and the fact that 
management  turn  a  blind  eye  when  they  know  that  the  labour 
brokers  are  exploiting  workers  (Interview,  Shop  Steward  Cape 
Town, 24 September 2008). 
This study was conducted at a time when there was heated debate in South Africa 
on  the  operations  of  labour  brokers.  The  labour  movement  and  its  allies  are 
claiming that this type of employment exploits workers, is a new form of ‘slavery’ 
and must therefore be banned, while the employers argue that labour brokers are 
necessary  as  they  provide  specialisation  and  flexibility  which  is  key  in  the 
industry.  These  contrasting  views  were  strongly  reflected  in  the  interviews 
conducted with both employers and trade unions.
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3.2.5 Sub-contracted workers
Subcontractors are usually hired by the main contractors to do certain parts of the 
work on a project that may or may not require ‘specialised skill’. The difference 
between  subcontractors  and  labour  brokers  is  that  subcontractors  are  hired  to 
perform  a  specific  job  task  while  labour  brokers  provide  labour  only.  The 
subcontractors will  enter into a commercial contract with the main contractor to 
perform a certain specified task. The subcontractors employ their own staff, which 
may also be segmented into core and casual staff. These workers work the project, 
usually with own terms and conditions of employment, which are usually inferior 
to those pertaining to workers of the main contractors.
Traditionally  subcontractors  were  hired  to  perform  minor  tasks  requiring 
specialisation.  In  the  2010  projects  and  the  industry  in  general,  the  main 
contractors are giving much of the work to subcontractors. The main contractors 
have become what  one construction  employee  referred to  as the ‘managers  of 
subcontractors’. In the 2010 projects, the subcontractors employ the majority of 
the workforce.
The study noted that the main contractors tend to use subcontractors for much of 
the  work,  as  reflected  by  the  fact  that  at  all  the  2010  construction  sites  the 
subcontractors employ the majority of the workforce. The trade unions estimated 
that  at  all  the  2010  construction  projects;  at  least  60%  of  the  workforce  is 
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employed  by  subcontractors  (Interview,  NUM  National  Co-ordinator 
Construction, 19 August 2008). 
The  employers  strongly  defended  the  extensive  use  of  subcontractors  in  the 
industry as they argued it brings flexibility ideal for a cyclical industry such as 
construction  (Interview,  Human  Resources  Manager  Cape  Town,  12  August 
2008). The trade unions bemoaned the fact that subcontractors exploited workers 
to raise profit margins. 
One observation made in this study is the fact that most of the subcontractors have 
very close links to the main contractors, who usually use the same subcontractors 
wherever  they  get  a  contract  (Interview,  NUM  National  Co-ordinator 
Construction, 19 August 2008).
The study noted that an average of at least 30 subcontractors are at each of the 
projects  examined in this study,  but this figure fluctuates as the subcontractors 
move in and out of the projects. The management at one of the projects could not 
even give a correct figure of how many subcontractors were on site.
The trade unions lamented the conduct of some of the subcontractors, who they 
accused of being exploitative and anti trade unions. Subcontractors are notorious 
for  altering  workers  on  a  daily  basis,  taking  advantage  of  the  high  levels  of 
unemployment  in  the  country  (Interview,  BCAWU  National  Co-ordinator,  22 
September  2008).  Some  are  said  to  drive  every  morning  to  street  corners 
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frequented by job seekers to pick up prospective employees and pay them cash at 
the end of the day. The trade unions castigated this development as they claimed it 
made it impossible for them to organise workers in this category (Interview, NUM 
National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008).
Most of the subcontractors  are said to be repulsive to trade unions. One trade 
unionist recounted how at one of the sites the union made contacts with some of 
the subcontracted workers. They were baffled to discover that the following day 
these  workers  had  all  been  replaced  by  new  workers,  after  the  employer 
discovered that they had been in contact with the union. He explained:
I  spent  almost  the  whole  day  explaining  to  three  subcontracted 
workers on why they should join the union and was successful in 
signing  up  two  out  of  the  three  who  were  employed  by  one 
subcontractor. When they got to their employer,  the one who did 
not join the union reported to the employer that the two had joined a 
union and that was the end of their employment. The following day 
we were joined by two new faces (Interview, Shop steward Cape 
Town, 24 September 2008).
This  form  of  employment  has  of  late  become  the  most  prevalent  form  of 
employment in the industry, despite the insecurity.
3.2.6 Migrant workers
The  prevalent  use  of  migrant  workers  paints  another  dimension  to  the  labour 
relations in the construction industry in South Africa. Migrant labour has been a 
significant  part  of  South  Africa  labour  force  since  the  discovery  of  gold  and 
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diamond  in  the  late  nineteenth  century.  However,  unlike  in  the  past,  most  of 
today’s migrants are illegal. 
The construction industry is one of the industries in South Africa with some of the 
highest  levels  of  migrant  labour,  usually  from the  neighbouring  and  regional 
countries. According to the trade unions, migrant workers constitute over 70% of 
the  workforce  in  the  construction  industry  (Interview,  NUM  National  Co-
ordinator  Construction,  19  August  2008;  Interview,  BCAWU  National  Co-
ordinator 26 August 2008). The industry is an entry point of many migrants into 
the South African labour  market  as it  demands a  high proportion of unskilled 
labour. Competition pressure demands the use of cheap and flexible labour. 
However, the study observed an unusually low engagement of migrant labour by 
the main contractors. The unions claimed that management had made a deliberate 
attempt to reduce migrant labour in the projects to avoid attention from the media 
due to the high profile of the 2010 Soccer World Cup (Interview, NUM National 
Co-ordinator  Construction,  19  August  2008).  One  organiser  remarked  on  the 
prevalence of migrant labour in the industry:
At  this  project  there  was  close  to  over  a  hundred  construction 
workers, most of who were working in the country without permits 
and  all  were  apparently  from  one  neighbouring  country.  They 
worked and lived on site under deplorable conditions not acceptable 
to  local  employees  (Interview,  BCAWU  National  Organiser,  22 
September 2008).
45
Migrant labour, however, is still very significant in the 2010 stadium construction 
projects,  but  it  come  in  through  the  labour  brokers  and  subcontractors.  An 
interview revealed why most migrants are not trade union members:
Trade unions are only for South Africans and not for a migrant like 
me,  as  the  moment  my  boss  discovers  I  attended  a  trade  union 
meeting  that  is  the  end  of  my  job.  I  want  to  be  a  trade  union 
member  but  my  job  and  status  does  not  allow  me  to  be  one 
(Interview, Construction Worker Soccer City, 20 September 2008).
The union acknowledged the presence of migrant  workers in the projects,  and 
complained that migrant workers were elusive and resistant to most  traditional 
union organising efforts (Interview, NUM National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 
August  2008).  The  unions  claimed  they  faced  same  predicament  with  labour 
brokers and subcontractor workers. The trade unions revealed that they organise 
migrants, labour-broker workers and subcontract workers; however, attendance at 
trade  union meetings  indicated  that  permanent  staff  dominated  the  debate  and 
issues relating to other groups of workers were hardly discussed.
3.3 Trade Unions in 2010 Construction Projects
3.3.1 Overview
The  history  of  trade  unions  in  South  Africa  is  intimately  linked  to  the  colonial  and 
apartheid legacy. It is impossible to review the history of trade unions without making 
reference to the issue of race (Ncube, 1985). Black and white trade unions evolved from 
different  backgrounds and went  through different  trajectories.  The white  trade unions 
evolved from migrant  workers from Europe while black trade unions emerged out  of 
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political  frustration and economic  destitution that  affected the  country’s  black people 
(Ncube, 1985:146). The first trade unions in the construction industry were craft unions 
formed by migrant artisans. Although black trade unions emerged in the early twentieth 
century,  they  were  only  recognised  after  the  1979  Wiehanh  Commission 
recommendations.
During the struggle against apartheid, political parties were banned for much of 
the period and it was largely through the trade unions that the struggle for freedom 
was articulated. The trade unions and trade unionists during this era played a dual 
role  against  workplace  injustice  and apartheid.  Buhlungu (2003)  suggests  that 
during the anti-apartheid struggle the trade union officials were both organisers 
and activists.
In the construction industry trade unions have been traditionally fragmented and very 
weak.  In  1987  COSATU  resolved  to  bring  together  the  different  unions  that  were 
organising in the construction  industry, to form one big union. Hence the Construction 
and Allied Workers Union (CAWU) was set up in 1987 out of four unions as a COSATU 
project (COSATU, 1997). This was in line with COSATU principle of ‘one union one 
industry’. However, the COSATU project failed to meet the challenge in the construction 
industry. As a result, COSATU reviewed its position at its Seventh Congress in 1997, and 
resolved to merge CAWU and NUM. This was aimed at creating synergy from merging a 
weak affiliate to a strong one. Currently there are over five trade unions organising in the 
construction industry, but only NUM and BCAWU have a significant membership.
3.3.2 National Union of Mineworkers
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NUM was  formed  in  1982  as  a  Council  of  Unions  of  South  Africa  (CUSA) 
project; it was meant to be a trade union for black workers in the mining industry. 
It  is  one of the biggest  COSATU affiliates,  currently organising over 250 000 
workers from a peak of over 300 000. NUM was originally a mining industry 
union but now organises in  three sectors:  mining,  building  and energy.  In  the 
construction  industry,  NUM organises about  78 000 workers (Interview,  NUM 
National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008).
3.3.3 Building, Construction and Allied Workers Union
BCAWU is the oldest union in the industry, with a membership of around 28 000. 
It  is  affiliated  to  NACTU,  which  has  a  policy  of  independence  from  the 
government,  political  parties  and  religious  groups.  However,  this  study  was 
surprised to observe that  BCAWU members  use politically inclined slogans at 
their meetings, which contradicts their policy of political independence.
The study observed that BCAWU initially used to have a majority membership at 
most of the 2010 projects. This has since changed, as NUM is now the majority 
union at most of the 2010 stadium construction projects. Ironically the majority of 
the employers  declared they preferred working with BCAWU rather  than with 
NUM:
BCAWU is a less trouble maker compared to NUM. We used to 
have  fewer  problems  and strikes  when it  was  the  majority  trade 
union and most of us employers generally prefer to work with them 
compared  to  NUM. NUM changed the  industrial  relations  in  the 
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industry  (Interview,  Human  Resources  Manager  Cape  Town,  12 
August 2008).
 The employers and the trade unions both concurred that there is a very low level 
of unionisation at 2010 projects. The average was estimated at around 20%, and it 
was only around 4% when construction of the projects commenced (Interview, 
Human  Resources  Manager,  Nelspruit  28  October  2008;  Interview,  NUM 
National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008).
3.4 Stadiums: Civil Engineering or Building Engineering Projects?
 
From the onset there was a question of whether the construction of the stadiums 
constituted  building  engineering  projects  or  civil  engineering  projects.  This 
distinction is significant as it result in radically different industrial regimes.
The  civil  engineering  sector  is  regulated  by  a  Minister  sectoral  determination 
promulgated in terms of section 56 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 
1997. This provides minimum conditions of employment. There are no bargaining 
councils in this industry, but negotiations for conditions above the minimum are 
conducted  at  national  level;  employers  are  represented  by  the  South  African 
Federation for Civil Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC), and the trade unions are 
represented by BCAWU and NUM.
On the other hand, the building engineering industry is regulated by bargaining 
councils which are sector and area specific, and are constituted in terms of section 
27 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. However, of late many of the bargaining 
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councils  have  been  disintegrating  .There  are  currently  only  four  operating 
bargaining councils  nationally.  These are the Cape of Good Hope,  Kimberley, 
North  and  West  Boland  and  Bloemfontein  building  bargaining  councils.  The 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Gauteng building bargaining councils collapsed in the late 
1990s  and  early  2000s  respectively  (Interview,  Executive  Manager  Collective 
Bargaining, Department of Labour, 11 August 2008).
There  was  no  consensus  on  whether  these  projects  were  building  or  civil 
engineering projects. The civil engineering sectoral determination defines the civil 
sector as: 
...the sector in which the employer (other than local authorities) and 
employees are associated for the purpose of carrying out work in 
connection with one or more of the following:
(a) The  construction  of:  aerodrome  runaways  or  aprons; 
aqueducts; bins or bunkers; bridges; cable ducts; cassions; raft or 
other  maritime  structures;  canals,  cooling  water  or  other  towers; 
dams, docks, harbours, quaysor wharves; earthworks, encasements; 
housings or support for plant, machinery or equipment; factory or 
works chimneys; filter beds; land or sea defence works; mine head 
gear,  pipelines  piers,  railways,  reservoirs,  river  works,  roads  or 
streets;  sewerage  works,  sewers,  shafts  or  tunnels,  silos;  sports 
fields  or  grounds,  swimming  baths;  viaducts  or  water  treatment 
plants ... ( Department of Labour: Sectorial Determination 2 Civil 
Engineering  Sector  Government,  Gazette  No  26049  February 
2004).
 One of the building sector collective bargaining agreements defines the building 
sector as: 
... without in any way limiting the ordinary expression of the word, 
the industry in which employers and their employees are associated 
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for the purpose of erecting, completing, renovating, repairing, and 
maintaining or altering buildings and structures whether the work... 
(Bargaining  Council  for  Building  Industry(Cape  of  Good  Hope) 
Extension  of  Collective  Bargaining  Agreement  to  non  parties, 
Government Gazette No 8711 July 27, 2007).
Normally the client would determine at the tendering stage, in consultation with 
the architect, whether a project is a building project or a civil engineering project. 
All  the  stadium construction  projects  were tendered  as  building  projects.  This 
came as a surprise to the trade unions who argued that the projects were civil 
engineering projects. One of the unionists remarked:
We do not know who exactly made the decision that the projects are 
building when the majority of the work is civil  engineering.  The 
demarcation was made without consulting the trade unions and we 
had  to  challenge  this  (Interview,  NUM  National  Co-ordinator 
Construction, 19 August 2008). 
This  decision  had  significant implications  on  the  industrial  relations  of  the 
projects. It is not clear why the local authority and the contractors preferred the 
project as building projects when the nature of the work apparently suggested they 
were civil engineering projects. One of the managers argued:
The stadiums have a roof and hence they are buildings, unlike the 
sports  field  or  grounds  which  are  referred  in  the  sectoral 
determination  as  civil  projects  (Interview,  Human  Resources 
Manager Nelspruit, 28 October 2008).
While the reasons behind the decision were not clarified, it is significant to note 
that the two sectors are regulated by separate labour relations regimes, with civil 
engineering  projects  much  more  highly  regulated  than  building  engineering 
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projects. The trade unions were structurally too weak to challenge this decision 
(Interview, NUM National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008).
3.5 Government Recruitment Policy
To achieve its socio-economic goals of poverty reduction, employment creation 
and  skills  development,  the  government  adopted  a  policy  which  requires  all 
contractors of public projects to employ at least 70% of the workforce from the 
local community within a radius of 70 kilometres of the project (DPW, 1998). 
This was also designed to facilitate sustainable economic activity in rural areas.
The policy had some impact on the labour relations at some of the project and on 
trade union organising strategies. A manager commented:
We support the government policy which guarantees employment to 
the local population.  This goes a long way in poverty alleviation 
and skills development. In addition this helps us attain our corporate 
governance  goal  of  returning  something  to  the  surrounding 
communities  where  we  get  our  business  (Interview,  Human 
Resources Manager Nelspruit, 28 October 2008).
However,  some  employers  lamented  the  enforcement  of  this  policy  as  they 
claimed it negatively affected their operations:
The policy forcing us to recruit from the local community is absurd. 
The  government  should  just  create  employment  throughout  the 
country and abolish this policy. Each time we are faced with new 
workers to train who may never use the new acquired skills again 
after demobilisation. I have seen how absurd this policy is when we 
were  contracted  to  construct  bridges  over  a  national  road  that 
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stretched for over 700 kilometres. Each time we moved construction 
from one bridge to the next we had to carry out a staff audit  to 
verify  the  eligibility  of  the  workers  to  continue  working  on  the 
project. Those coming from outside the required radius had to be 
terminated  (Interview,  Human  Resources  Manager  Soccer  City 
Stadium, 15 August 2008).
The trade unions were ambivalent on the impact of this policy to their organising 
strategies and sources of power. One trade unionist remarked:
This policy is designed to suppress the voice of the trade unions as 
it  guarantees  permanent  existence  of  weak  trade  unions  at  the 
workplace.  The workers who come in every time are new to the 
industry and the trade unions and this may cause friction among the 
workforce. The government must abolish this policy to promote a 
strong  trade  union  movement  in  the  industry  (Interview,  NUM 
National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008).
But another trade unionist differed:
Most of the workers are from Soweto and this policy here is not an 
issue as we are all from the same community. Therefore, it does not 
make  any  difference  on  us  as  a  trade  union.  As  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  the  policy  makes  no  difference  to  our  organising 
strategies  (Interview,  Shop  Steward  Soccer  City  stadium,  17 
September 2008).
This  study  observed  that  the  impact  of  this  policy  was  affected  by  the 
geographical location of a given project. For the projects that are located in major 
urban centres such as Johannesburg and Cape Town this was not an issue, unlike 
in  smaller  urban  areas  such  as  Polokwane  and  Nelspruit  adjoining  rural 
settlements.
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3.6 Comparison of selected sites
See Table 3.1 page 55 for a graphical summary of the selected sites.
Table 3.1: A comparison of the selected sites
Cape Town
Green Point Stadium
Johannesburg
Soccer City Stadium
Nelspruit
Mbombela Stadium
 Total workforce ±2000 ±2000 ±1500
Main contractors Murray and Roberts, 
WBHO
Grinaker LTA and Interbeton Basil Read and WBHO
Sector Building Engineering Civil Engineering Civil Engineering
Trade unions 
represented
NUM main trade union, 
BCAWU minority trade 
union.
NUM only trade union at site 
- Recognition Agreement.
NUM main trade union, 
BCAWU minority trade 
union
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Industrial action and 
causes
Three reported industrial 
actions – causes: 
transport, transport 
allowance and project 
bonus.
No reported industrial action 
but a four-hour work stoppag
e over bonus.
Several industrial actions - 
over eighty strikes reported. 
Causes: bonus, 
sector dispute demarcation, 
land question.
Subcontractors and 
labour brokers
Average  number  20  and 
constitute 60% of 
workforce.
Average number over 30 and 
constitute over 60% of 
workforce.
Average number over 15 
and constitute over 60% of 
workforce.
Shop stewards Part-time basis, elected 
by all workers but only 
full-time workers 
eligible.
Full-time, elected by all 
workers  but  must  be  from 
permanent staff.
Part-time,  can  be  from any 
employee category.
Project labour 
agreement
N/A Recognition  Agreement  with 
NUM
N/A
Trade union density Less than 20%. More than 60%. Less than 20%.
Collective bargaining Bargaining Council - 
Cape of Good Hope 
Building Bargaining 
Council.
 Ministerial Sectoral 
Determination.
Minister Sectoral 
Determination.
3.6.1 Cape Town: Green Point Stadium
This is the only 2010 project where the industrial relations are regulated by a bargaining 
council. The stadium is a new construction project which commenced in 2007 as a joint 
venture between the main contractors WBHO and Murray and Roberts. It proved very 
difficult to determine the exact number of employees on this project as there are various 
employers – the main contractors, subcontractors and labour brokers – who come on and 
off  the  project  depending  on  the  task  contracted  to  perform.  However,  the  main 
contractors  estimated  that  there  were  around  2 000  workers  working  on  the  project 
(Interview,  Human  Resources  Manager,  Cape  Town,  12  August  2008).  The  main 
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contractors  employ  less  than  40%  of  the  total  workforce,  and  the  rest  work  for 
subcontractors and labour brokers.
Subcontractors are on and off the project at any time depending on their contract of work; 
hence their number on the project fluctuates but is usually around thirty. There are also 
three  labour  brokers.  The  subcontractors  employ  workers  on  their  own  terms  and 
conditions, with no sanction from the main contractors. The subcontractors sometimes 
subcontract part of their work to smaller subcontractors. The subcontractors and labour 
brokers are required to register with the bargaining council as employers of the workers 
they employ. However, the bargaining council gives them a sixty-day window period to 
comply with this provision. As a result most have resorted to employing workers for less 
than sixty days to evade this regulation.
There  are  two  trade  unions  organising  workers  at  the  Green  Point  stadium 
construction  project-  NUM and  BCAWU.  Reflecting  the  general  trend  in  the 
industry,  the  trade  unions  on  this  project  are  facing  immense  challenges  in 
organising workers. One manager commented:
There is no union worth the name in this sector. Trade unions are 
only strong in the mines. In construction the workers see no reason 
to  be  trade  union  members.  Most  of  our  staff  is  LDC and their 
contracts  are tied to  the project.  I  would be surprised if  the two 
unions  have  20% membership  between them at  this  project.  We 
only see them when there is  a  strike .That’s  when they come to 
recruit  members  (Interview,  Human  Resources  Manager  Cape 
Town Green Point Stadium, 12 August 2008).
The trade unions concurred with the employers that their membership was very 
low at the project but attempted to qualify it:
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Our membership in the industry and at this project is very low due 
to structural barriers faced by the trade unions. All the contractors 
are making more use of subcontractors and labour brokers to evade 
the  trade  unions.  The  workers  for  the  labour  brokers  and 
subcontractors  are  very  difficult  to  unionise  as  their  employers 
victimise  them if  they become union members  (Interview,  NUM 
Regional Co-ordinator Cape Town, 22 September 2008).
The bargaining Council also confirmed the low levels of unionisation at the site 
and in the sector in general. According to the bargaining council the trade unions 
are  struggling to  meet  the required levels  of  representativeness  at  the council. 
(Interview, Executive Manager: Cape Building Bargaining Council, 23 September 
2008).  The study ironically observed that the majority union at  the bargaining 
council,  the Building Workers Union (BWU), was not represented at the 2010 
Cape  Town  stadium  construction  project  as  it  does  not  have  a  significant 
membership there.
Despite the provision for organising rights in the Labour Relations Act, the two 
trade unions are facing many barriers in organising the workers on this project:
We are required to give at least two weeks’ notice if we want to 
access the workers at the stadium and this may be declined by the 
employers, and one of the union organisers has been banned from 
accessing  the  stadium.  This  makes  our  work  as  trade  unions 
impossible  (Interview,  NUM Regional  Organiser  Cape Town, 22 
September 2008).
The restriction of the trade unions by the contractors at this project can be viewed 
as  absurd  and reflects  the  adversarial  relationship  between  the  employers  and 
trade unions.
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The shop stewards on this project are elected by all the workers but must be from 
the permanent staff; in addition they do shop steward duties on a part-time basis. 
This is against the trend at most big construction projects where shop stewards are 
now normally full-time. The trade unions only allow permanent  workers to be 
elected  as  shop stewards and the other  workers are  only accepted  as  ordinary 
members. One trade unionist explained:
Shop stewards have to be permanent staff because they know what 
is  happening  in  the  company.  We  cannot  have  an  LDC  or 
subcontractor worker as shop stewards because they can lose their 
job any time. The union cannot rely on them because they are not 
part  of  the  company  in  the  first  instance.  Those  who  are  not 
permanent  workers  do  not  enjoy  some  of  the  industry  benefits. 
Hence we cannot have someone as a shop steward who does not 
enjoy some of the benefits as this would create friction (Interview, 
BCAWU National Organiser Cape Town, 22 September 2008).
The employers  cited the lack  of  representativeness  as the main  reason for  the 
absence of permanent shop stewards:
We cannot allow having a permanent shop steward when over 80% 
of our workforce is not unionised. The trade unions need to attract 
members  first  before  we  can  have  permanent  shop  stewards 
(Interview,  Human  Resources  Manager  Cape  Town,  12  August 
2008).
The study observed that the presence of the part-time shop stewards hardly made 
any difference as they have limited time to carry out shop steward duties due to a 
tight work schedule.
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There are clear indications that some policies adopted by trade unions alienate the 
subcontract and labour-broker workers who, ironically, constitute the majority of 
the workforce.  This confirms that they are failing to adopt and adapt the new 
organising  strategies  as  propounded  in  Milkman  (2000),  Clawson  (2003)  and 
Lopez (2004).
Most complex construction projects usually have what is referred to as a project 
labour agreement (PLA). This is a collective agreement that regulates industrial 
relations  for a  given project.  The Green Point  stadium does not  have such an 
agreement,  as  terms  and  conditions  of  employment  are  set  by  the  Building 
Bargaining Council of the Cape of Good Hope. 
The bargaining council  had initially proposed setting  up an office at  the 2010 
stadium construction site, but the request was declined by the joint venture’s main 
contractors (Interview, Executive Manager Cape Building Bargaining Council, 23 
September 2008). The bargaining council had hoped that this would have ensured 
that all players at the site would have easy access to the council and to ensure 
compliance with industry terms and conditions of employment. The refusal by the 
main contractors to this request raises eyebrows.
The study observed that, at the grassroots, the trade unions are perceived by the 
ordinary workers as competitors of the bargaining council as they offer similar 
and  supplementary  benefits  such  as  a  medical  aid  scheme,  funeral  cover  and 
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pension cover. The trade unions use these benefits as a way to attract and retain 
membership. 
The study noted with surprise that a significant number of ordinary workers could 
not distinguish between the trade union and the bargaining council. Some feel the 
trade unions are irrelevant as they offer the same services already offered by the 
bargaining  council  (Interview,  Construction  Worker,  Cape  Town  Stadium,  25 
September  2008).  This  high  level  of  ignorance  reflects  the  poor  organising 
strategies and structures of the trade unions at the site.
The study noted the presence of a very strong Works Committee at the site, which 
is elected by all the workers but is not affiliated to any of the trade unions. The 
purpose of this committee, according to the workers, is to handle any collective 
issues  related  to  work  and  to  act  as  a  channel  of  communication  between 
management and all the workers (Interview, Construction Worker, Cape Town 
Stadium,  25  September  2008).  Most  of  the  workers  felt  that  the  Workers 
Committee was more representative and better positioned to articulate their plight. 
The  committee  meets  every  month  or  when  necessary.  The  study  noted  the 
significance  of  the  committee  as  it  was  responsible  for  initiating  most  of  the 
strikes at the project:
All  the  strikes  here  were  organised  and handled  by  the  workers 
themselves outside the trade unions through a Workers Committee. 
The trade union only got  involved at  the much late  stage of the 
strikes  (Interview,  BWI  2010  Campaign  Co-ordinator,  23 
September 2008).
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The fact that the strikes were not organised by the unions reflects that the trade 
unions are very weak and have poor structures.
As was the case at most of the projects, there was a dispute on whether the project 
was a building or a civil engineering project. However, unlike at other projects, 
the grassroots employees were in agreement with the employer  in defining the 
project as a building project:
We prefer the building sector because it has better pay conditions 
and grading system compared to the civil  engineering sector. We 
are therefore in agreement with our employers in using the building 
engineering sector conditions (Interview, Shop Steward Cape Town 
Stadium, 24 September 2008).
The trade unions at the national level however, preferred the stadiums to be civil 
engineering  projects  rather  than  building  projects  because,  according  to  their 
argument,  the  building  engineering  sector  is  too  fragmented  nationally  when 
compared  with  the  civil  engineering  sector  (Interview,  NUM  Regional  Co-
ordinator, Cape Town, 22 September 2008).
The Cape Town project had one more surprising contrast with other projects, as 
the employers  here are said to  be firmly behind the existence of a bargaining 
council, unlike the employers in other areas where the bargaining councils have 
collapsed  (Interview,  Executive  Manager  Cape  Building  Bargaining  Council, 
Cape  Town 23 September  2008).  Many reasons  were suggested  regarding  the 
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reason for this variation. According to the unions, the Cape Building Bargaining 
Council is dominated by white ‘conservatives’ who firmly support the bargaining 
council  as  a  matter  of  race  solidarity.  They  are  then  able  to  dominate  it  by 
sponsoring ‘yellow trade unions’ (Interview, NUM Regional Coordinator Cape 
Town, 22 September 2008).
3.6.2 Johannesburg: Soccer City stadium
This project is under a joint venture between two main contractors: Grinaker-LTA 
and Interberton. There are an average of two thousand workers on site working for 
the joint venture main contractors, subcontractors and labour brokers.
Before  construction  commenced  on  this  project,  the  management  of  the  joint 
venture extensively engaged the trade union, NUM and negotiated a framework 
agreement for industrial relations for the project. This agreement, referred to as a 
recognition  agreement,  defines  the  rights  of  the  trade  union,  discipline  and 
grievance-handling  procedures,  and  many  other  pertinent  industrial  relations 
issues. The recognition agreement applies to all contractors and labour brokers at 
the site. NUM is recognised as the majority trade union but must have majority 
membership of the core staff.
Since the government requires community-based recruitment on public projects, 
70% of the employees on this project are drawn from the local community. This is 
in line with government socio-economic policy. The recognition agreement makes 
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a presumption that all workers on limited duration contracts are from the local 
community; hence they are not entitled to transport or a transport allowance and 
housing or a housing allowance. In line with government recruitment policy, the 
project joint venture set up a recruitment desk in Soweto, where all new workers 
are  screened before  recruitment.  After  recruitment  all  the workers  undergo an 
induction process which covers an introduction to industrial relations, health and 
safety, and other relevant issues. All the new employees on the project have to be 
recruited through this recruitment desk (Grinaker LTA-Interberton –NUM Soccer 
City Stadium Recognition Agreement, 2007).
This  project  as  was  tendered  as  a  building  engineering  project.  However,  the 
employer volunteered to use the civil engineering rates of pay, which are superior, 
without  any  pressure  from  the  trade  union  (Interview,  Senior  Shop  Steward 
Soccer City Stadium, 17 September 2008).
The workers  of  every contractor  on site  are  required  to  select  a shop steward 
through a secret ballot. The elected worker will work as a shop steward on a part-
time  basis.  In  addition  to  the  part-time  shop  stewards  for  each  and  every 
contractor, all the workers on site elect one shop steward who works for the whole 
project as a full-time shop steward (Interview, Senior Shop Steward Soccer City 
Stadium,17  September  2008).  All  the  shop  stewards  from  the  individual 
contractors  on  site  constitute  a  shop  steward  forum,  which  meets  once  every 
month or as and when necessary.
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The study noted that the trade union at this project does not have problems in 
accessing workers. Trade union meetings are conducted once a month for an hour, 
paid  by  the  employer.  There  is  a  site  industrial  relations  forum  which  is  a 
communication and co-ordinating forum, and comprises equal representation from 
the employers and the shop steward committee (Interview, Senior Shop Steward 
Soccer City Stadium, 17 September 2008).
The trade union density on this project  was reported at  over 60% by both the 
employers and the trade unions, which is unusual compared with the general trend 
in  the  industry.  This  is  explained  by  the  close  collaboration  between  the 
employers  and the trade union.  The co-operation between the trade union and 
management has resulted in an agency shop agreement which allows the union to 
charge for services to non-members.  Hence most workers preferred joining the 
trade  union than  remaining  as  non-members  (Interview,  Construction  Workers 
Soccer City Stadium, 20 September 2008). 
In  the  recognition  agreement  the  union  and  management  agreed  to  refer  all 
disputes to arbitration. This implies that the union has given up its right to strike 
(Grinaker-LTA-Interberton-NUM  Soccer  City  Construction  Recognition 
Agreement, 2007).
On average there are about 30 subcontractors and labour brokers on site. All the 
contractors and labour brokers on the project are bound by the provisions of the 
recognition agreement. However, the union indicated that there, nevertheless are 
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some subcontractors who violate the agreement. Such violations are few however, 
as the union is ‘responsible’ for policing the agreement.
The  study  observed  that  despite  a  very  strict  recruitment  procedure,  migrant 
workers still find way onto the project through labour brokers and subcontractors. 
The union revealed that it organises migrant workers, but the study observed that 
their participation in the union is very low. The union leadership structures do not 
accommodate  migrant  workers.  The  migrant  workers  themselves  perceive  the 
trade union as an organisation for local citizens. The trade union does not engage 
any  special  strategy  in  organising  migrant  workers  (Interview,  Construction 
Worker Soccer City Stadium,25 September 2008).
Industrial relations  at the 2010 stadium became a contentious issue marked by a 
strike wave across most of the 2010 stadium construction projects. The Soccer 
City project was, however, spared from this wave and was reported to be the only 
site with a ‘clean’ industrial action record. However, investigations by this study 
revealed that the project witnessed a four-hour work stoppage which was resolved 
with  minimum  impact  on  production  (Interview,  Human  Resources  Manager 
Soccer City Stadium, 15 August 2008).
The  main  contractors  at  the  Soccer  City  stadium have  exhibited  a  culture  of 
general tolerance and co-operation with the trade union. This is unusual in the 
industry,  where the relations  between the unions  and management  are  usually 
adversarial  (Interview,  NUM  National  Co-ordinator  Construction,19  August 
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2008). The study observed that the collaboration with the unions exhibited by the 
employers on this project did not start on this project. They attempted to influence 
employers in the industry to adopt the same culture and proposed a project labour 
agreement for all the 2010 projects, but the proposal was shot down (Interview, 
Industrial Relations Manager SAFSEC, 05 September 2008).
 
3.6.3 Nelspruit: Mbombela Stadium
The  stadium is  being  constructed  by  a  joint  venture  between  Basil  Read  and 
WBHO as the main contractors. There are about 1 500 workers employed on the 
project,  and  about  30% of  them  are  employed  by  the  main  contractors.  The 
remainder  are  employed  by  subcontractors  and  labour  brokers.  There  is  an 
average  of  30  subcontractors  and  labour  brokers  on  site  (Interview,  Human 
Resources Manager Nelspruit Stadium,28 October 2008).
The stadium is shrouded in a land ownership dispute which has immense impact 
on industrial relations at the project. The stadium is being constructed about ten 
kilometres outside the town on a piece of land which is part of the land restored to 
the Matsefeni community as part of a land claim. This land is collectively owned 
by the community, who are mostly farm workers. Surprisingly, the Nelspruit local 
authority authorised the construction of the stadium without the consent of the 
local community. The local community pressure group opposed the annexure of 
the land by the local authority, and organised demonstrations. The local authority 
later clandestinely bought the land from one of the community leaders for a rather 
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absurd figure -one rand. The issue was taken to court. The local authority offered 
to build a school for the local community, and to provide some jobs and contracts 
in  the construction of the stadium instead of money (Interview,  Shop Steward 
Nelspruit Stadium,31 October 2008).
Several negotiations were conducted to resolve the land issue, but the contractors 
were not involved. In line with government socio-economic policy, at least 70% 
of the workers are from the local community. Some of them are also in the local 
community  pressure  group  leadership  which  is  involved  in  contesting  the 
annexure of their land.
The first shop steward at this site was initially from the core staff, as the trade 
union then only allowed a shop steward from the permanent staff. This caused 
problems as the shop steward did not understand the local community politics and 
the land question as he was from Johannesburg. The workers from the community 
on limited  duration  contracts  challenged the union policy that  only permanent 
staff could be shop stewards. One of them remarked:
How can we be led by a person who does not have an intimate 
understanding of our plight as a community? Our problems are not 
only tied to work but they transcend from the community where we 
live. Most of these permanent staff come with the employers from 
Johannesburg and are  usually  his  ‘blue-eyed’  boys.  They always 
side with the employer each time we had grievances and we could 
not  tolerate  this  (Interview,  Construction  Workers  Nelspruit 
Stadium, 29 October 2008).
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The LDC workers from the local community challenged the union position that an 
LDC worker could not be a shop steward. The LDC workers claimed that shop 
stewards from the core workers were aligned to management. They argued that it 
was not fair to be represented by someone from a minority who has better terms 
and conditions of employment. The local community workers ‘hijacked’ the union 
after realising that it was in contradiction of their interest as community members. 
The union did not offer much resistance to the ‘takeover’. The union succumbed 
to the pressure and the shop steward was replaced by a worker on limited duration 
contract, who ironically was the chairman of the community pressure group.
The  Nelspruit  stadium was  tendered  as  a  building  project (instead  of  a  civil 
engineering  project),  and  therefore  adopted  the  building  sector  rate  of  pay 
negotiated  through  the  Gauteng  voluntary  bargaining  forum,  where  the  main 
contractors have their head offices. There is no project labour agreement for this 
project.  The building sector rates are much lower than the civil  rates, and this 
resulted in disparity in pay with the other 2010 stadium construction projects. This 
sparked  a  strike,  which  was  referred  to  the  CCMA  for  determination.  The 
employer later withdrew the case and agreed to pay civil engineering rates, after 
pressure from the union and the strikes. This prompted the local authority to direct 
the contractors to comply with the workers’ demands (Interview, Shop Steward 
Nelspruit  Stadium,  31  October  2008).  The  contractors  and  the  local  authority 
agreed to pay the civil rates but this did not change the status of the project as a 
building project.
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The two main trade unions  – BCAWU and NUM – organise the workers at the 
stadium. Initially when construction commenced,  the level  of unionisation was 
less than 4%, and BCAWU was the majority union (Interview, Human Resources 
Manager Nelspruit Stadium, 28 October 2008). However, this position has since 
changed,  as  NUM is  now the  majority  union  at  the  project.  The  trade  union 
density as reported by management has since risen to around 20%.
The subcontractors employ most of the workforce at the site but their contracts 
with  the  main  contractors  impose  industry  conditions  on  all  subcontractors’ 
workers. However, enforcement is a problem as there are still violations on pay 
and  other  conditions.  In  response  to  the  violations  by  subcontractors  to  the 
minimum conditions  as  set  in  the  agreements,  the  trade  union  under  the  new 
leadership from the community organised a strike at the project in sympathy with 
subcontractor’s  workers  who were subjected  to  deplorable  conditions  of  work 
(Interview, Shop Steward Nelspruit Stadium, 31 October 2008).
The displacement of the union leadership by the workers from the community 
strengthened the trade union as it managed to link the workplace struggles to the 
community struggles. This enabled the union to engage in strategies that allow the 
articulation of associational power to symbolic power.
69
Chapter Four
TRADE UNION POWER AND ORGANISING STRATEGIES
4.1 Union Power
Industrial action and trade union density are overt and covert measures of trade 
union power respectively. According to Salamon (2000:411), industrial action:
 
Includes any temporary suspension of normal arrangement initiated 
unilaterally by employees (whether through their union or not), or 
management, with the aim of exerting pressure within the collective 
bargaining process. 
While the capacity of a trade union to successfully engage in industrial action can 
be used as a measure of trade union power it is, however, not always the strong 
trade  unions  that  use  industrial  action.  According  to  Aminnzade  (cited  in 
Klandermans, 1984), strong trade unions have the means to take action but they 
also have a less frequent need to resort to industrial action. This is amplified by 
Proven  and  Cloward  (cited  in  Klandermans,  1984),  who  argue  that  strong 
organisations (trade unions) prevent action. Taking from this context therefore, 
industrial action is a phenomenon which is common in both strong and weak trade 
unions. 
Industrial action is a collective action by workers; it is grounded in the use of old 
traditional sources of power. Kelly (1998) uses mobilisation theory to explain the 
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causes of industrial action. According to his argument, workers are more willing 
to  engage  in  industrial  action  when  they  experience  a  sense  of  injustice  or 
unfairness  in  the  employment  relation  and  when  they  hold  a  collectivist 
orientation to work.
Industrial action is a common phenomenon in South African industrial relations. 
Industrial actions in South Africa, as in other countries, are not homogeneous as 
they vary in form and magnitude – from a few hours’ work stoppages to violent 
and  protracted  industrial  actions  such  as  the  2007  Public  Sector  strike,  for 
example.  The willingness  of individual  workers to  take  up industrial  action  is 
connected to the question of the renewal of the trade union, according to Clawson 
(2003). Can Clawson’s argument be relevant to the South African construction 
industry?  Is  the spate of strikes that  rocked the construction of 2010 stadiums 
linked to a trade union renewal, or is it a mere reflection to the weaknesses of the 
trade unions?
An  analysis  of  the  Department  of  Labour’s  (DoL)  2005  and  2006  Industrial 
Action annual reports in South Africa highlight the construction industry as one of 
the industries having the lowest levels of industrial action and man-hours lost to 
strikes (DoL, 2005, 2006). However, recent events seem to be challenging these 
statistics.
The industrial actions in the 2010 projects varied in form and duration, from the 
four-hour stoppage at Soccer City to the protracted and violent three-week strike 
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at Nelspruit. Industrial actions are grounded on the use of traditional sources of 
power. They vindicate the capacity of the workers to draw from these sources of 
power.  Therefore,  an  analysis  of  the  industrial  actions  can  help  us  to  clearly 
understand whether there has been erosion of the old sources of power and the 
possibility of the establishment of new source of power that may be derived from 
articulation of the old sources of power to the new. 
4.2 Industrial Actions in Selected 2010 Stadium Construction Sites: Use of 
Old Source of Power
4.2.1 Soccer City: Johannesburg
This project has experienced the least number of industrial actions and has almost 
achieved harmonious industrial relations. The only strike recorded at this site was 
a  four-hour work stoppage over a project  bonus dispute.  Management  and the 
trade union could not agree on the amount for a project bonus (Interview, Human 
Resources Manager Soccer City Stadium,15 August 2008). The workers downed 
tools for about four hours before management conceded to their demands. This 
dispute was resolved expeditiously,  such that many sources and analysts  argue 
whether this should be described as an industrial action.
Before having interviews with the stakeholders at the site, and based only on press 
reports, this study initially presumed that there had been no industrial action at 
this site. It was only after the interviews with management at the stadium that the 
study established that a brief and unreported industrial action had taken place. 
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As an indicator of the ambivalence inherent in their role, the shop stewards were 
not prepared to reveal a negative relationship between the trade union and the 
employer:
We do not have any problems with our employer here. We have a 
project labour agreement which prescribes everything and whenever 
we have a problem we just  make reference to the project  labour 
agreement. Our employer is fair and the workers have no grievance, 
which  is  reflected  by  the  fact  that  we  have  never  recorded  an 
industrial action (Interview, Shop Steward Soccer City Stadium, 17 
September 2008).
The claim by the shop steward that there had never been an industrial action at 
Soccer City was however, refuted by management, who revealed that there had 
been a four-hour work stoppage. Despite a very high level of institutionalisation 
of conflict at this project, the workers were still able to draw from the old sources 
of power.
4.2.2 Green Point Stadium: Cape Town
The Green Point Stadium reported at least two industrial actions by the time this 
study was conducted (see Table 4.1). The interviews with the various stakeholders 
on this project indicated that there had in fact been more industrial actions than 
recorded, as only the big industrial actions with an impact on production were 
recorded (Interview, BCAWU National Organiser,22 September 2008).
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Table 4.1: Industrial Actions at Green Point Stadium, Cape Town
Green Point Stadium,  Cape Town
Main contractors: WBHO, Murray and Roberts
Trade Unions: NUM, BCAWU
No. Date Cause Comments
1 27 Aug 2007 Transport 
arrangements 
and transport 
allowances
• Unprotected strike for 2 days; involved 800 to 1 000 
workers; strike organised by Workers Committee. 
• Workers returned to work after interventions by 
COSATU, NUM and BCAWU.
2 18 Sept 2007 As above • Unprotected strike commenced on 18 September and 
workers returned to work on 25 September .Strike 
initially organised by Workers Committee.
• Alleged violence and damage to property.  
• Striking workers were locked out of the site.
• The employer obtained a court interdict ordering the 
workers to return to work.
• Between 20% and 25% of workforce unionised, 70% 
of the workers work for subcontractors.
The first strike was over a dispute about transport provision by the contractors to 
and from the site to town where the workers connected to public transport to and 
from home. The employers provided transport to the pick-up point, but workers 
were required to walk five minutes from the pick-up point. The second strike was 
about workers’ demand for a transport allowance. The workers on average require 
R30 per day for transport. Transport cost in an industry where the minimum wage 
is less than R2 000 per month is a very significant cost (Cottle, 2007).
The  strikes  at  this  stadium  followed  a  trend.  Most  of  the  strikes  were  not 
organised by the trade unions but by the site  Workers Committee, which is not 
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aligned to any of the trade unions but is elected by all the workers on the project. 
The  trade  unions  were  usually  drawn  into  the  strikes  at  a  much  later  stage, 
generally because management would be seeking ways to resolve the issue. The 
management would usually approach the trade unions first, as they have structures 
and legitimacy.  Management  seemed to be oblivious of the fact  that  the trade 
unions were not behind the strike in the first instance. The trade unions on the 
other  hand would normally  assume responsibility  in  an attempt  to  control  the 
strike and capitalise on the opportunity by recruiting as many new members as 
possible. Most of the strikes were not protected, and were violent with reported 
extensive damage to property. In one of the strikes some employees were arrested 
on suspicion of damaging property (Interview, BCAWU National Organiser, 22 
September  2008).  Once  a  significant  number  of  workers  engaged  in  a  strike, 
management would close off the site to protect damage to equipment and this did 
not mean all the workers were on strike (Interview, Human Resources Manager 
Green Point Stadium, 24 August 2008).
Management cited opportunism by the trade unions as the major cause of most of 
the  strikes;  according  to  their  argument,  the  workers  perceived  the  2010 
construction projects as an opportunity to make as much money as possible as it is 
a once-off opportunity.
The  workers  on  this  project  proved  the possibility  and  success  of  using 
associational power outside a trade union. They managed to form a new collective 
organisation other than a trade union.
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4.2.3 Mbombela Stadium: Nelspruit
With  over  seven  recorded  industrial  actions,  this  project  recorded  the  highest 
number  of  strikes  by the  time this  study was conducted  (see Table  4.2).  One 
manager explained:
We were in a strike mode for a long time .We witnessed at least six 
strikes and several work stoppages. In fact, for a period close to six 
months  I  would  say  we  were  in  a  strike  mode.  Some  time  the 
workers never even said they were on strikes but we could see it by 
a massive surge in productivity and this dragged for a very long 
time with some intermittent work stoppages, some of which were 
violent. In the last one, our patience was stretched too far and we 
decided  to  dismiss  all  the workers  (Interview,  Human  Resources 
Manager Mbombela Stadium Nelspruit, 28 October 2008).
Table 4.2 Industrial actions at Mbombela Stadium, Nelspruit
Nelspruit (Mbombela) 
Main contractors: Basil Read, WBHO
Trade Union: NUM
No. Date Cause Comments
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1 29-30 Nov 2007 Hourly wage 
rate, transport 
and travelling 
allowances, 
living 
allowance, 
alleged 
violation of 
BCEA, Project 
bonus.
The union was behind the strike.
2 11-15 Feb 2008 Demand to be 
paid at civil 
engineering 
sector rates.
The union was behind the strike.
3 2-7 April 2008 Wage disparity 
with other sites; 
payment on 
civil 
construction 
rates.
CCMA mediated dispute. Contractors agreed to pay civil 
engineering rates after instruction from the client – the 
local authority.
4 11 April 2008 Land dispute 
with local 
municipality.
Work stoppage for about 3 hours. The leadership of the 
union (NUM) was taken over by a shop steward who was 
a community leader and chairman of community pressure 
group.
5 24 April 2008 Land dispute 
with local 
municipality.
Work stoppage for about 5 hours, initially organised by a 
community pressure group.
6 6 May 2008 Subcontractor 
employees not 
paid.
Sympathy strike for those employees. Strike initially 
organised by community pressure group.
7 9 June 2008 Land dispute 
with local 
municipality. 
Work stoppage for about 2 hours; initially organised by 
community pressure group.
8 July 2008 Payment of 
performance 
bonus.
Strike lasted 3 weeks; initially organised by community 
pressure group.
Strike involved alleged violence and damage to property; 
four union members arrested for damage of 
equipment.500 workers dismissed, but later reinstated.
The causes of the strikes were varied and complex but include wage rate, violation 
of  the  Basic  Conditions  of  Employment  Act,  project  bonus,  civil  engineering 
rates, subcontractors and the land question. The issue of whether the project was a 
civil engineering or a building engineering one caused a number of strikes, as the 
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project  had initially  adopted building engineering  rates  which were inferior  to 
civil  engineering  rates.  Some  of  the  other  sites,  such  as  Soccer  City  in 
Johannesburg, had switched to civil engineering rates before a strike. This created 
disparity  in  the rates  of  pay among the  workers  at  the  different  projects.  The 
workers disputed the decision to use the building engineering rates. One worker 
explained:
All  the  other  2010  stadiums  construction  are  using  the  civil 
engineering rates while here we were using the building rates which 
are far less to the civil rates. We decided to go on strike to push the 
management to pay us the civil rates. We do not know who made 
the decision that we should use the building rates when all the other 
2010 sites were using civil rates. We are all constructing stadiums 
for  2010  and  hence  must  get  the  same  rewards-fair  and  simple. 
(Interview,  Construction  Worker Mbombela  Stadium, 29 October 
2008).
The strikes  forced  the  local  authority  to  pass  a  directive  to  the  contractors  to 
concede to the workers’ demand due to political pressure. The local authority had 
designated the project as a building project at the tendering stage, and it was on 
this basis that the project was tendered. The local authority agreed to meet the 
financial  obligation  linked  to  this  decision.  This  was  unusual  from  a  local 
authority,  as  they  are  traditionally  reluctant  to  be  involved  in  labour  relations 
issues on construction projects since they are not the employers.
 The last strike, in June 2008, was violent, as a motor vehicle and a guardroom 
were set alight; four trade union officials were arrested. All the strikes at this site 
were unprotected as they were in breach of the Labour Relation Act of 1995. In 
the  June  2008  strike,  the  main  contractor  responded  by  dismissing  its  entire 
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workforce of 500 and advertising in the press for new employees. The site had 
witnessed a series of intermittent  strikes for a long duration and the employer 
responded by dismissing all the workers (Interview, Human Resources Manager, 
Mbombela Stadium, 28 October 2008). It is significant to note that although all 
the workers at the site were reported to be on strike, the main contractor could 
only dismiss those who were in his employment. He had no jurisdiction over the 
employees  of  subcontractors  and  labour  brokers.  This  was  the  first  2010 
construction project to dismiss workers because of an industrial action.
Trade unions locally and globally castigated the decision and there was an outcry 
from various other quarters. The then President of South Africa happened to be on 
a  development  report-back ‘imbizo’  in  the area  soon after  the dismissals.  The 
trade  unions  and  the  community  organised  some  marches  and  demonstrations 
during this  event in protest  against  the dismissals  and to highlight  the general 
exploitation and poor conditions of work at the stadium. The workers were later 
reinstated  after  an  apparent  intervention  by  the  president  (Interview,  Shop 
Steward Mbombela Stadium, 31 October 2008).
By organising demonstrations and protests  at  political  meetings the workers at 
Nelspruit  stadium  were  able  to  use  strategies  that  allowed  articulation  of 
associational power to symbolic power, and used this as a new source of power. 
They  were  able  to  use  their  role  in  the  community  to  fight  for  an  industrial 
relations  problem.  This  was  payback time,  as  this  proved that  the relationship 
between the community and the workers can be symbiotic.
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One of the major key drivers of industrial actions was the land dispute between 
the local community and the local authority. More than four strikes were a result 
of the land question. This brought another dimension to the industrial relations at 
the project, as the cause of the strikes did not concern the employer. The workers 
used their role as workers to advance the interest of the community. One of the 
shop stewards narrated:
We are the workers and members of the community at  the same 
time and we decided the only effective way that we could resolve 
our  community  problems  was  through  the  use  of  our  collective 
power as workers. The employer as the contractor was not to blame 
for these strikes. Our strikes were targeted at the employer’s client, 
the local authority, who had unlawfully taken our land, and the only 
way we could put pressure was to stop this project which had all the 
eyes of the world (Interview, Shop Steward Mbombela Stadium, 31 
October 2008).
  
Most of the strikes were characterised by violence and were linked to community 
pressure groups which later ‘hijacked’ the trade union. 
4.2.4 Peter Mokaba Stadium: Polokwane
This project recorded at least three strikes by the time this study was conducted 
(see Table 4.3). The causes of the strikes varied from project bonus, solidarity 
with labour brokers workers and violations of agreement. All the strikes were in 
violation of the Labour Relations Act and hence were not protected.
Table 4.3: Industrial actions at Peter Mokaba Stadium, Polokwane
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Polokwane (Peter Mokaba Stadium)
Main contractors: WBHO
Trade Unions: BCAWU, NUM
No. Date Cause Comments
1 23-25 January 
2008
Labour broker 
failing to pay in 
accordance with 
minimum wage 
rates.
Unprotected strike organised initially by LDC but 
BCAWU later took over. Strike was in solidarity with the 
labour broker’s employees.
2 24 June to 2 July 
2008 and 16-30 
July 2008
Minimum wage 
rate and project 
bonus.
The strike was unprotected and the workers returned to 
work after the employer obtained a court interdict. 
However, the unprotected strike resumed later in July. It 
was settled when the workers accepted R1 000 for the 
remaining bonus. NUM organised this strike. 
Though it was on a lower scale and less organised compared to Nelspruit,  the 
issue of involvement of local community organisations was also a factor at this 
project. Decisions to go on strike were normally passed at mass meetings which 
were not necessarily controlled by the trade unions, and usually the decision of the 
local  workers  (who  are  normally  LDC  and  a  majority)  prevailed.  The  shop 
steward explained:
The decision to go on strike is usually passed on mass meetings 
which are not trade union meetings but attended by all workers on 
site. As a result such meetings may pass a decision violating the 
Labour Relations Act and the union cannot obviously control it. The 
workers would argue that the decision was not passed by the union 
in the first instance. Some of the LDC usually claims they cannot be 
bound by agreements made before they were employed (Interview, 
Shop Steward Peter Mokaba Stadium Polokwane, 20 August 2008).
The study observed that although the trade unions ended up leading the strikes, 
most of the strikes were initiated outside the trade unions. This could be expected 
as the majority of the workers were not trade union members.  In most  of the 
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strikes  management  would  accuse  the  trade  unions  of  failing  to  control  its 
membership,  ignoring the fact  that  the majority of the workers were not trade 
union members.
4.2.5 Moses Mabhida Stadium: Durban
The first strike concerned a dispute over  a project bonus which was coupled to 
other  demands:  safety  standards,  absence  of  an  ambulance  and  violation  of 
minimum wages by some of the subcontractors at the site (see Table 4.4). The 
causes  of  the  strikes  varied  as  they  included  project  bonus,  violation  of 
agreements by subcontractors and travel allowance.
Table 4.4: Industrial actions at Moses Mabhida Stadium, Durban
Durban (Moses Mabhida)
Main contractors: Group Five, WBHO
 Trade Union: NUM
Date Cause Comments
13 Sept 2007 Safety 
standards, 
absence of site 
ambulance, 
Work stoppage for part of the day.
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violation of 
minimum wage 
agreements by 
subcontractors.
7-19 Nov 2007 Health and 
safety 
improvements; 
appointment of 
safety officers; 
project bonus; 
violation of 
minimum wages 
by 
subcontractors; 
(payment of 
civil 
engineering 
rates).
Strike allegedly protected and involved about 1 200 workers.
Clashes with police occurred.
Strike occurred after Department of Labour condemned safety 
standards on the site.
Employers obtained an interdict preventing strikers from 
entering the site while on strike and damaging property.
NUM threatened secondary strikes by workers at other 
stadiums.
3 Dec 2007 Project bonus 
and travel 
allowances.
Most  of  the  strikes  were  reported  as  violent,  and  on  some  of  the  strikes  the 
workers organised demonstrations and marches around the town highlighting the 
levels  of exploitation and poor conditions of employment  in  the industry.  The 
majority of the strikes were not protected as they were in violation of the Labour 
Relations Act.
4.3 The 2010 Industrial Actions: An Analysis
There  has  been  some  form  of  industrial  action  at  all  the  2010  construction 
projects, albeit of varied magnitude. This confirms that the construction workers 
have the capacity to draw on traditional sources of power despite limitations. The 
Nelspruit case, for example, has shown that the use of traditional sources of power 
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is  not  limited  to  industrial  relations  issues  but  can  be  used  even  to  fight  for 
community  issues.  This  also  indicates  that  the  workers  should  not  be  viewed 
merely as workers, but they have other identities which may allow the articulation 
of associational power to symbolic power. Trade unions need to take note of this 
if they are to succeed in organising vulnerable workers.
Many scholars such as Milkman (2000), Clawson (2003) and Lopez (2004) have 
proposed  worker-community  alliances  as  a  new  strategy  for  trade  union 
organising. The main purpose for such an alliance, according to their arguments, 
is apparently for the benefit of the trade unions facing challenges from erosion of 
traditional  sources  of  power  which  are  usually  workplace-based.  This  study 
suggests that this relationship can be symbiotic, as was shown at Nelspruit. The 
benefit from the alliance was not only one way (at Nelspruit) as the workers were 
able  to  use  associational  power,  which  they  articulated  with  symbolic  power 
through the alliance with the community for the benefit of both parties. Many of 
the  analysts  ignore  the  fact  that  the  alliance  could  also  directly  benefit  the 
community.The the usual presumption is that it is only for the benefit of the trade 
union.
Most of the strikes had common characteristics, such as that they were not led by 
the unions but by workers outside the trade unions. The trade unions usually had 
to ‘hijack’ the strikes as a way of controlling them but at times were not even 
successful in doing so. The strikes were wildcat in nature, pointing to a weakness 
of the trade unions and vindicating the argument postulated by Aminnzade (cited 
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in Klandermans, 1984:108), who argued ‘that strong trade unions have the means 
to take action but have a less frequent need to engage in industrial action’.
The study shows that if trade unions are  too weak to articulate the position of 
workers,  the  workers  may  counter  react  by  forming  informal  collective 
organisations outside the trade union. The workers will then be able to draw from 
associational  power  but  outside  the  trade  union.  These  informal  organisations 
were  common  at  almost  all  the  projects  used  in  this  study  but  the  level  of 
informality and organisation varied. At Nelspruit, for example, the workers had an 
informal  collective  organisation  which  was  community-based  and  initially 
operated outside the trade union but later  succeeded in ‘taking’  over the trade 
union.  This  was  a  highly  organised  collective  group-  though  informal.  At 
Polokwane the existence of an informal organisation was also apparent though 
loosely organised. Cape Town had a Workers Committee which was independent 
of the trade unions and could be argued to have assumed the role of a trade union.
The formation  of  informal  organisations  outside the trade  unions  is  a  form of 
repudiation to the terms and conditions negotiated by the trade unions, as argued 
by Allens (cited in Hyman, 1972). According to his argument, ‘unofficial action 
as in informal trade unionism, occur because formal trade unions are incapable of 
fulfilling their  function satisfactorily and for this reason lost  control over their 
members’  (Allens,  cited in  Hyman,  1972:49).  This  is  clearly vindicated  in the 
2010 construction projects used in this study.
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4.4 Institutionalisation of Industrial Conflict
According  to  Marx  (cited  in  Ncube,  1985:1),  conflict  is  inherent  in  an 
employment relationship. The capitalist system creates two parties – the employer 
and  the  employee  –  with  conflicting  interests  and  an  unequal  relationship. 
According  to  Hyman  (1972:75),  ‘conflict  of  interest  in  an  employment 
relationship is scarcely questionable’ as conflict has been institutionalised through 
collective bargaining which allows the parties in the employment relationship to 
make compromises. In agreement, Dublin (cited in Hyman, 1972:75) argues that 
‘we have built the practise of collective bargaining as a social device for bringing 
conflict  to a successful resolution’.  This study vindicates the fact that  inherent 
conflict  in  employment  relations  can  be  successfully  managed  through  the 
institutionalisation of the conflict as shown at Soccer city stadium.
At  all  the  projects  used  in  this  study there  were  however,  different  levels  of 
institutionalisation  of  conflict.  Conflict  is  managed  by  setting  up  bargaining 
councils and forums, as well as discipline and grievance handling procedures. The 
Soccer City case study shows the highest  levels of conflict  institutionalisation, 
where  the  trade  union  is  fully  recognised,  conflict  is  accepted  and  its 
manifestations  are  socially  regulated.  The  management  at  Soccer  City  viewed 
trade unions not as an enemy but as a tool that  could be used to achieve and 
maintain stability. This is in agreement with Hyman (1972:76), who argues that 
‘trade unions have achieved in eradicating the causes of intense social conflict and 
the industrial conflict is expressed in innocuous forms now that the legitimacy of 
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trade  unionism  has  been  generally  accepted’  but  conversely  warned  that  the 
‘institutional  needs  of  unions  themselves  leads  naturally  to  moderate  and 
conservative policies’. Hyman (1972:80) further argues that ‘as trade unions gain 
acceptance  so  industrial  conflict  is  rendered  increasingly  professionalised  and 
antiseptic’.  The institutionalisation  of conflict  which promotes  collaboration of 
management with labour can make a contribution to efficient management, as was 
shown at Soccer City. According to one manager:
We find it easy [sic] to have a strong union than not to have or have 
a  very  weak one.  We find  it  easy  [sic]  to  deal  with  five  union 
representatives  than  deal  with  two  thousand  workers  (Interview, 
Human Resources Manager Soccer City Stadium, 15 August 2008).
The positive acceptance of the trade union by management at Soccer City, unlike 
at  other  2010  projects,  has  resulted  in  the  integration  of  the  unions  into  the 
administration  structures  of  the  firms.  The  trade  union  at  Soccer  City  has 
ostensibly taken over the duty of ensuring that subcontractors and labour brokers 
comply with the industry agreements and the recognition agreement.  The trade 
union has become part of the establishment, as argued by Hyman (1972:79). At 
Soccer City there is strong evidence of ‘mature industrial relations’ which manage 
to accommodate the inherent industrial conflict. Or can we conversely argue that 
the trade union was overtly hijacked by management?
Compared  to  Soccer  City,  Cape  Town  and  Nelspruit  projects  were  less 
institutionalised,  and  this  explains  why  they  accounted  for  more  strikes  than 
Soccer City. Soccer City also strongly suggests that conflict cannot be suppressed 
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simply  by  incorporating  the  trade  union  hierarchy,  as  argued  by  Hyman 
(1972:82). The workers still find ways to express their grievances despite a high 
institutionalisation  of  conflict.  This  is  usually  common  where  a  significant 
number of the workers are not unionised. Despite a very high level of conflict 
institutionalisation,  the  workers  at  Soccer  City  went  on  a  four-hour  work 
stoppage.  This  agrees  with  Danvendort  (cited  in  Hyman,  1972:100),  who 
highlighted the limits of conflict institutionalisation. According to his argument, 
Institutionalisation of conflict through trade unionism leads in turn 
to dissension within the union to unauthorised action in the form of 
unauthorised  strikes  and  the  more  sophisticated  trade  unions 
respond by attempting to control such conflict by leading the strikes 
(Danvendort, cited in Hyman, 1972:100). 
This was observed at most of the sites used in this study – most of the strikes were 
initiated by the workers without the trade unions, but the trade unions usually 
hijacked the strike in order to lead the strike.
4.5 Why Weak Trade Unions?
4.5.1 Overview
The  construction  industry  is  one  industry  in  South  Africa  where  the  labour 
movement can be pronounced as weak if we use trade union density and militancy 
as measures of trade union power. In 2005 the union density in the industry was 
put at just 10.4% (Labour Force Survey, 2005). The study has shown that despite 
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a weak trade union the workers in the 2010 projects were able to make use of 
traditional sources of power, as was shown in the industrial actions.
As the  industry was in  decline  for  an  inordinate  period,  there  was  decline  in 
human resources development. At present, therefore, there is a critical shortage of 
skilled manpower in the industry. The shortage of skills is threatening the capacity 
of the industry to deliver in the face of the current unprecedented boom (Garrun, 
2008:3). This has in turn enhanced the marketplace power of workers and trade 
unions. The highly skilled workers in the industry have a much higher level of 
marketplace power due to the current critical shortage of skilled personnel in the 
industry.  Many  of  them  see  no  need  to  join  trade  unions  and  gain  from 
associational power. This is confirmed by the fact that most trade union members 
are  from the unskilled and semi-skilled grades  (Interview,  NUM National  Co-
ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008).
The trade unions in the construction industry have been traditionally weak, save 
for  a  few  early  craft  unions  that  existed  in  the  industry  in  the  early  years. 
Compared  to  other  industries  such  as  mining  and  the  metal  industries,  the 
construction  industry  generally  has  weak  structural  power.  This  study  has 
identified  a  number  of  factors  that  account  for  this  weakness.  They  include 
government  recruitment  policy,  migrant  labour,  and  trade  union  failure  to 
recognise the profile of the workforce. Each of these is discussed below.
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4.5.2 Government recruitment policy
There is no consensus within the trade unions on whether the government policy 
on community-based recruitment for public construction projects had a negative 
impact on the labour movement. There are two schools of thought on the impact 
of this policy. On one hand are those who argue that the policy is responsible for 
the weak labour movement  in the industry, as it  undermines the trade unions’ 
traditional sources of power. They claim the policy is responsible for flooding the 
industry with workers from the local community who are inherently reluctant to 
join trade unions due to  the nature of  their  contract  of  employment,  which is 
short-term. These workers are therefore exposed to exploitation.
This study challenges the claim that the workers from the local community are 
reluctant  to  join  the  labour  movement  due  to  the  nature  of  their  contract  of 
employment. The Nelspruit case study suggests that the workers from the local 
community are not only willing to be trade union members but, given a chance, 
they are even prepared to lead the union and become the agents of change.
While the policy cannot be held accountable for the weak trade union movement 
in the industry, there is some credibility to the notion that the policy results in the 
alignment of government interests to the interests of the contractors in the industry 
by creating and promoting a form of employment which is difficult to organise 
using the traditional trade union organising strategies. There is a strong argument 
that  the  policy  promotes  the  permanent  existence  of  a  weak  trade  union  by 
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promoting  the  use  of  casual  labour  in  the  industry,  which  is  inherently  non-
unionised. It is therefore debatable who actually benefits from this policy between 
the  employers  and employees.  However,  the  Nelspruit  case  study proved  that 
these workers are not only organisable but that they can assist the trade union in 
innovating and discovering new sources of power.
4.5.3 Migrant labour
According to NUM, migrant labour accounts for over 70% of the industry total 
workforce, and most of these migrants are from the neighbouring and regional 
countries (Interview, NUM National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008). 
According to the unions, most of the employers in the industry have switched to 
the use of cheap and flexible migrant labour. The migrant workers are vulnerable 
to exploitation and abuse. Trade unions face a challenge in organising migrant 
workers as they are alleged to be ‘resistant’ to traditional organising strategies.
The construction industry is the entry point for migrant workers into the South 
African labour market. The presence of migrant labour in the construction of 2010 
stadiums is  complicated  by the  fact  that  they are  mostly  employed  by labour 
brokers and subcontractors. As they enter the labour market from a weaker point 
as  migrants,  the  labour  brokers  and  the  subcontractors  further  worsen  their 
predicament as they are in the category of workers that are traditionally difficult 
for trade unions to organise due to their status.
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Migrant workers do not constitute a very high proportion of the workforce in the 
2010 projects, according to the trade unions in the projects. However,  migrant 
labour is still found on the projects, usually working for subcontractors and labour 
brokers.
The trade unions indicated that they do organise migrant workers; however, they 
only accept those with the proper documentation to work in the country. This is 
ironic as the majority of the migrants do not have such documentation. The study 
observed that the few migrant workers in the projects are not actively involved in 
most  of  the  trade  union  activities.  The  trade  unions  organising  in  the  21010 
projects have adopted an indifferent approach in as far as migrants are concerned. 
The unions have apparently failed to make use of the new forms of organising 
ideal for vulnerable workers as propounded by Sherman and Voss (2000). They 
argued that trade unions need to recognise the worker culture, interest and work 
situations.
4.5.4 Trade Union failure to recognise the workforce profile
This  study  observed  that  the  workforce  in  the  construction  industry  is  not 
homogeneous but is segmented into the core, limited duration contract,  labour-
broker and subcontracted workers, in line with the Von Holdt and Webster (2008) 
typology. These workers have different rights, privileges and sources of power. 
This ostensibly demands that trade unions engage different organising strategies 
when organising workers in these varied categories as there is no ‘one size fit all’ 
approach.
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This study observed that the organising strategies engaged by the trade unions in 
the 2010 construction projects are oblivious to the varied worker categories in the 
industry. The trade unions ostensibly presume that all their members are or should 
be  from  the  core  staff.  For  example,  at  all  the  trade  union  meetings  and 
conferences  attended during this  study,  only the issues affecting the core staff 
dominated the debate while issues for other categories were not even discussed or 
were pushed to the periphery. The other categories of workers such as migrant, 
labour-broker  and  subcontracted  are  glaringly  missing  in  the  trade  unions 
structures. 
According to Goldman (2003:21), employers have segmented the workforce into 
different  categories  with  different  rights  and  privileges,  which  now  makes  it 
difficult for workers and trade unions to find common cause. According to her 
argument, this has resulted in the erosion of the collective interest on which trade 
unions are based. This study argues, however, that the trade unions are doing very 
little to find or create collective interest among the different workers. They have 
apparently  failed  to  recognise  the  various  categories  of  workers  within  the 
industry. This has partly accounted for a weak trade union in the sector.
4.6 The 2010 Summit: Result of New or Old Sources of Power?
The  2010 construction  boom was  not  business  as  usual,  contrary  to  what  the 
employers  and  the  government  wanted  the  workers  to  believe.  The  workers 
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naturally saw this as a window opportunity with a potential to uplift their lives. 
Employers and workers had varying perceptions on what the 2010 construction 
boom could bring. As a result of this difference the employers in the industry and 
the government saw no need for a special dispensation in industrial relations for 
the construction of 2010 projects.
The trade unions suspect the reason why the government and the employers were 
reluctant to put in place a special dispensation for the industrial relations in the 
construction of 2010 projects was because they perceived the labour movement in 
the industry as weak and therefore irrelevant. According to the trade unions the 
government  was  only  concerned  in  seeing  the  completion  of  the  stadiums 
(Interview, NUM National Co-ordinator Construction, 19 August 2008).
The  time  frame  required  to  complete  the  stadiums  is  very  limited  and  hence 
demands minimum disruption. The completion of the stadiums in time is critical 
for the successful hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. This has put pressure on 
both the contractors and the employees. The structural power of the workers has 
been enhanced in the process.
The labour movement has traditionally been weak in the construction industry. 
The Department of Labour’s Industrial Action Annual Reports for 2005 and 2006 
indicate the construction industry as one of the industries with the lowest levels of 
industrial action in South Africa. The contractors and government were therefore 
surprised  by a  sudden upsurge  in  industrial  actions  in  the  2010 projects.  The 
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strikes  in  the  stadium construction  prompted  debate  on  the  capacity  of  South 
Africa to meet the FIFA deadlines on stadium construction.
The government, through the Department of Sports and Recreation, which is the 
custodian  of  all  2010  preparations,  approached  the  CCMA  for  advice  and 
guidance on how the industrial relations problem that had surfaced in the 2010 
projects could be resolved. The aim was to ensure that the problem would not 
affect  the delivery of the 2010 infrastructure.  A summit  was convened by the 
Department  of  Sports  and  Recreation  in  collaboration  with  CCMA.  All  the 
stakeholders in the delivery of the 2110 infrastructure were invited; these included 
organised labour, organised business and the government (Department of Sports 
and Recreation and CCMA, 2008). The summit acknowledged the significance of 
the  games  to  South  Africa  and  the  need  for  co-operation  in  order  to  sustain 
harmonious industrial relations for successful delivery of the 2010 infrastructure.
The summit enabled the stakeholders to recognise the importance of dialogue in 
the industry, which was missing, and the need to displace the reactionary culture 
in  the industry.  The summit  resolved  to come up with a  long-term stabilising 
effort and to strive for a decent work agenda in the industry. Poor communication 
was identified  as  one of  the  sources  of  the  problem,  an indication  that  South 
Africa failed to learn from other countries which have hosted such major sports 
events. It failed to be proactive, but was reactive, as shown by the summit which 
was  a  response  to  the  strikes.  South  Africa  could  have  learned  from  other 
countries, such as from the experience of the 2000 Sydney Olympics, which have 
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been described as one of the best  success stories  in the handling of industrial 
relations during the preparations and hosting of a major sporting event. At Sydney 
2000  the  government,  labour  and  business  signed  a  memorandum  of 
understanding which outlined the industrial relations framework that was to be 
adopted during the construction of the infrastructure for the games (Webb, 2001). 
This measure ensured that harmonious industrial  relations prevailed throughout 
the construction of the various projects for the games; as a result the construction 
was almost entirely free of industrial action. 
The striking difference between Sydney 2000 and South Africa 2010  has to do 
with the relationship of the parties involved in the delivery of the infrastructure 
required  for  the  games.  The  parties  in  Sydney  2000  adopted  a  collaborative 
approach while the South African parties did not.
The summit called by the Department of Sports and Recreation is clear indication 
of  the  outcome  from the  workers’  use  of  traditional  associational  sources  of 
power,  as the summit  was a reaction to  the strikes.  Hence the perception  that 
workers  in  the  construction  industry  can  no  longer  succesfully  make  use  of 
associational power is a myth.
Although the summit was a reaction to the strikes at the 2010 projects, most of 
these  strikes  were  not  organised  by  the  trade  unions.  The  summit  therefore 
ignored or omitted to include the people who were actually behind the ‘problem’. 
This  also  suggests  that  the  institutionalisation  of  conflict  in  the  employment 
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relationship has resulted in the trade unions being used just as a way of control. 
This is in agreement with Hyman (1972:75).
4.7 Organising the Privileged?
A trade union is a collective of workers who, regardless of status, come together 
as a unit to protect their collective interest. The rationale of having a trade union is 
to enhance the collective power of the workers to match that of the employer, 
which is inherently superior.
The study observed a new form of trade unionism emerging in the construction 
industry.  The trade unions have been ostensibly transformed into a class of the 
privileged, which can strongly be argued to be cascading into a labour aristocracy. 
The unions have shifted away from the traditional principle of trade unions – ‘an 
injury  to  one  is  an  injury  to  all’  –  as  they  have  now  almost  become  elitist 
institutions. The trade union is apparently now a club of the elite who get superior 
benefits  compared  to  the  rest.  The  trade  unions  in  the  industry  ostensibly 
represents the interests of the core staff, who are the elite of the industry, enjoying 
benefits such as transport, housing, pension and medical – benefits not enjoyed by 
the majority of the workers in the industry. The study noted, for example, that at 
Green Point and Soccer City stadiums the trade unions are in no way disputing 
why the workers outside the core are not getting these benefits.  This strongly 
suggests that the trade unions in the sector have been hijacked by an elite class of 
workers.
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The apparent transformation of the trade union into an elitist institution is clearly 
reflected  in  their  policies,  organising  strategies  and  collective  bargaining 
agreements. At Nelspruit, for example, the non-core workers had to force a way to 
penetrate and ‘hijack’ the union after suffering from alienation by the union. At 
most of these projects the non-core workers could not be elected as shop stewards. 
It is therefore unfortunate that some of the trade unions’ strategies and policies are 
biased against the workers who ironically constitute a majority in the industry.
4.8 Trade Union Traditional Forms of Organising
It  is  clear  that  the trade  unions’  organising  effort  in  the  construction  industry 
mainly focuses on the core staff while paying lip service to the other categories of 
workers such as the labour brokered and subcontracted. The trade unions perceive 
their members to be only the permanent workers. The trade unions in the industry 
mainly  use  the  traditional  forms  of  organising,  which  confirms  the  point  by 
Hyman (1972:81) who argued that ‘the institutional needs of a trade union leads 
to conservative and moderate policies’.
Where the trade unions are adopting the new organising strategies that draw from 
articulation  of  associational  to  symbolic  power,  it  is  rather  by  force  or 
coincidence, as shown at the Nelspruit case study. At Nelspruit, the creation of 
linkages between community and trade union problems was not created by the 
trade unions; neither was it a coincidence, but was imposed by the workers. The 
98
workers played a dual role, as workers and as members of the community, and 
quite often they used these roles interchangeably to suit a particular advantage.
The  workers  at  Nelspruit  highlighted  a  shift  to  new  organising  strategies  by 
engaging  in  political  and  social  unionism.  They combined  social  and political 
unionism when they linked the community struggles to the workplace struggles 
through  the  demonstrations  of  the  dismissed  workers  with  the  support  of  the 
community at  political  rallies.  This resulted in the articulation of associational 
power to symbolic power as they were appealing to the public sense of justice and 
taking the struggle away from the workplace to the public arena.
As proof  of  the  extensive  use  of  traditional  forms  of  organising,  most  of  the 
unions’  recruitment  strategies  are  centred  at  plant-level  recruitment.  The trade 
unions hardly engage the workers outside the workplace. This is despite the fact 
that the workers, for example at Green Point stadium, mostly reside in the same 
neighbourhoods of Gugulethu and Khayalitsha and share the same mode of daily 
transport  to  work.  The  BCAWU  national  organiser,  for  example,  ignorantly 
declared  that  his  union did not engage workers outside their  workplaces.  This 
strongly  suggests  that  the  trade  unions  are  oblivious  to  the  fact  that  certain 
categories of workers – such as migrant workers and those hired by labour brokers 
and  subcontractors  –  are  so  vulnerable  such  that  they  cannot  be  effectively 
contacted or organised at the workplace.
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4.9 New Sources of Power and Organising Strategies
This study confirms that the workers in the construction industry make use of 
traditional  sources  of  power  despite  the  inherent  limitations.  New  sources  of 
power  can  be  established  through  the  articulation  of  associational  power  to 
symbolic  power  to  compensate  for  the  weakening  of  structural  power.  The 
Nelspruit case study indicates the potential of articulating associational power to 
symbolic  power.  The  community  ‘took  over’  the  union  structures  and 
implemented their own new strategies that were grounded in the articulation of 
associational to symbolic power. They also linked political unionism to symbolic 
power when, for example, they demonstrated at political rallies to appeal to the 
public  sense  of  moral  justice.  They  adopted  the  new organising  strategies  by 
creating an intimate link between community struggles and workplace struggles. 
This is clearly represented by a shop steward who played dual roles as a shop 
steward and community leader.
The difference between community issues and workplace issues became blurred 
as  the  people  involved  were  one  and  the  same.  The  strategy  adopted  by  the 
workers at Nelspruit conforms to Lopez’s (2004) new forms of organising in a 
culture  of  anti-unionism  which  simultaneously  combines  the  use  of  internal, 
community and corporate campaigns with political organising. However, the fact 
that the trade union had to be hijacked by the community for this to be realised 
strongly suggests lack of clear strategies by the trade unions grounded in the use 
of  new sources  of  power  and organising  strategies.  The  case  study,  however, 
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strongly suggests that there is potential in articulating the old to new sources of 
power, which can give leverage to the workers and their trade unions.
BCAWU was  initially  the  majority  trade  union  in  most  of  the  2010  stadium 
construction projects. However, NUM managed to expand the proportion of its 
membership in the projects and displaced BCAWU as the majority trade union at 
almost all the projects. This study attempted to investigate the reasons behind this. 
The study observed that although both the unions apparently eschewed adoption 
of new forms of organising,  NUM was better  adapted to change.  At Nelspruit 
stadium NUM adapted  to  change when it  gave insignificant  resistance  to  ‘the 
takeover’ of the union structures by the community. It easily adapted to the use of 
political  and  social  movement  unionism adopted  by the workers  through their 
links with the community. In addition, NUM has a better financial resource base 
compared  to  BCAWU,  which  makes  it  able  to  fund  extensive  organising 
strategies. It is the only trade union in South Africa, for example, with a training 
college  that  is  dedicated  to  training  shop  stewards.  NUM  has  identified  the 
construction sector as an area of potential growth in the face of a decline in the 
mining sector, from which it draws the majority of its membership.
4.10 2010 BWI Campaign for Decent Work – New Source of Power and
 Organising Strategy?
The  Soccer World Cup is one of the most popular major sporting events with a 
very  strong  public  appeal  which  attracts  attention  from  various  spheres.  The 
global  union  in  the  construction  industry,  Building  and  Woodworkers 
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International (BWI), in collaboration with the local South African trade unions 
and  NGOs,  decided  to  use  the  2010  construction  projects  as  a  platform  to 
campaign for decent work in the construction industry (Cottle, 2007).
The campaign was launched at the World Social Forum held in Nairobi in 2007, 
and was then later implemented in South Africa in October 2007. The campaign is 
targeted  at  mobilising  football  fans  world-wide  and to  put  pressure  on  FIFA, 
government and the companies involved in the construction of 2010 projects. The 
partners  of  the  project  are  BWI,  Labour  Research  Service  and  Suisse  Labour 
Assistance (SLA). The trade unions involved are BCAWU, NUM and SABAWO, 
which are all affiliates of BWI (Cottle, 2007).
The use of this strategy by the trade unions is targeted at drawing on moral and 
symbolic power. The campaign produced booklets and vouchers highlighting the 
deplorable conditions of employment in the industry. It contrasted, for example, 
the disparity in pay between the lowest-paid worker in the industry and that of the 
highest-paid chief executive of one of the major construction firms. According to 
Cottle  (2007),  remuneration  of  executives  in  the  construction  industry  was 
increased by an average of 36% while the lowest-paid workers got a mere 8%. 
According  to  the  campaign,  the  increase  for  construction  executives  was  the 
highest of all economic sectors in South Africa. In addition, the sector posted an 
increase of profit by 36%.
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The campaign further questions whether the development outcome of the 2010 
construction  boom is  in  the  interest  of  the poor  or  the  construction  bosses.  It 
highlights the fact that the demand for flexible forms of employment in the sector 
has  created  jobs  of  very low quality  with a  poor  remuneration  that  makes  no 
impact  on  poverty  alleviation  (Cottle,  2007).  This  challenge  the  government 
policy on community-based recruitment, which apparently ignores the quality of 
the jobs, created.
The campaign is conducted and the materials are distributed through the Internet, 
marches,  demonstrations,  brochures  and other  mediums.  The  campaign  makes 
various press releases at opportune times, but targets drawing support from the 
public. One such press release was an opinion published in September 2007 titled: 
‘Exploited stadium workers right to down tools’ and another in September 2008 
titled:  ‘2010  construction  workers  feel  the  pinch  while  bosses score’.  In 
November 2007 the campaign led a march in Durban by the 2010 construction 
workers who were on strike, with banners and flyers exposing the exploitation of 
workers in the 2010 construction projects.
The strategy draws from symbolic leverage which involves making an intersection 
between exploitation and social discrimination and appeals to the sense of moral 
justice (Von Holdt and Webster, 2008). As an example, the campaign highlighted 
the  fact  that  it  would  take  a  general  worker  in  the  industry  constructing  the 
prestigious  2010  stadiums  139  years  to  earn  an  average  construction  sector 
executive’s one-year income, while an artisan would take 56 years (Cottle 2007). 
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This form of campaign clearly involves recasting the construction workers’ poor 
working conditions as morally wrong by exposing the high levels of exploitation 
in the industry, thereby appealing to the public sense of justice.
The  study  noted  that  FIFA  is  neither  the  employer  nor  the  client  in  the 
construction of 2010 stadiums. The employers are the various contractors engaged 
by  the  respective  local  authorities,  who  are  the  clients.  FIFA  only  sets  the 
minimum conditions required for a host country to qualify to host the games. The 
host country sets up a Local Organising Committee (LOC) which oversees the 
construction  of  the  stadiums.  As part  of  the decent  campaign  programme,  the 
trade unions in the construction industry led a delegation to FIFA head office in 
Switzerland to lodge an appeal that it uses its leverage to ensure decent work in 
the construction of the 2010 stadiums. This is despite that  FIFA is neither  the 
client nor the employer.
One intriguing observation made by this study in as far as this campaign strategy 
is concerned is the fact that only a few shop stewards were privy to this strategy 
while a majority of the ordinary workforce declared ignorance. This ostensibly is 
because the campaign is driven from top to bottom, but nevertheless managed to 
record  some success.  While  this  form of  campaign  is  a  positive  indication  of 
coalition  building  among  the  competing  trade  unions  in  the  industry  and 
international solidarity, some of the industry trade union problems still emanate 
from trade union rivalry. This campaign, which is driven by the global unions in 
the construction  industry,  has drawn all  the main  trade unions in  the industry 
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together and opened up debate on the possibility of the unions working together as 
a united force beyond 2010.
The World Cup has a huge profile which attracts  extensive attention from the 
media,  and  this  creates  a  leverage  that  the  trade  unions  can  draw from.  The 
campaign  programme  used  media  press  releases  that  clearly  captured  public 
attention and empathy,  making an appeal to the public sense of justice on the 
question of right or wrong. By so doing the trade unions are moving the struggle 
away from the workplace into the public arena. Although the campaign has not 
yet uplifted the workers’ situation in the industry, it has shown some potential as 
it draws from the articulation of associational power to symbolic power and may 
be the new form of organising for the future as argued by Clawson (2004).
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Chapter Five
CONCLUSION
The study examined whether a boom in the construction industry can establish 
new sources of power for the trade unions in  the construction industry whose 
structural  power has been extensively undermined by the reorganisation of the 
production and labour processes.
The study suggests  that  workers in  the construction industry have potential  to 
develop  new  associational  strategies  that  recognise  the  potential  of  symbolic 
power, vindicating the argument by Von Holdt and Webster (2008). However, the 
trade  unions  and  the  employers  in  the  industry  have  highly  institutionalised 
conflict, but excluding the workers outside the core who ironically constitute the 
majority in the industry. The institutional needs of the trade unions have resulted 
in them adopting moderate and conservative policies, conforming to the argument 
by  Hyman  (1972:81).  This  has  resulted  in  them  failing  to  adopt  the  new 
organising strategies that draw from new sources of power.
Many trade  unionists  and analysts  argue that  workers  in  the  flexible  forms of 
employment, such as those hired by subcontractors and labour brokers, are not 
organisable,  as they claim they are  repulsive  to  union organising  efforts.  This 
study poses a strong challenge to such an assertion, as it highlights that most of 
these workers in the various 2010 projects were able to form and lead very strong 
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informal collective organisations outside the trade unions that were at times very 
successful in articulating their plight. This strongly suggests that these workers 
can  in  fact  be  organised  effectively,  contrary  to  the  widely  held  belief.  The 
problem may be emanating from the organising strategies engaged in by the trade 
unions  which may be alienating  them.  The Nelspruit  case study,  for example, 
suggests that the workers outside the core cannot only be organised collectively 
but, given a chance, are prepared to lead the trade union and bring in innovative 
strategies that  are glaringly lacking in the industry,  that  articulate associational 
power to symbolic power, which may work as a new source of power for the trade 
unions.
The study exposes a trade union movement in the construction industry that has 
apparently alienated itself from the majority of the workforce. The trade unions in 
the construction industry have ostensibly been transformed into elite institutions 
and almost resemble a labour aristocracy. This new form of trade unionism has 
created a highly institutionalised relationship with the employers in the industry to 
manage the inherent conflict in the employment relationship. The trade unions in 
the industry merely exist to safeguard the interest of the minority (the core) who 
have  superior  terms  and  conditions  of  employment.  This  has  tremendously 
compromised the position of the trade unions as a collective voice of the workers 
at the workplace as they have ceased to represent the majority. However, when 
faced with such a predicament, the workers will not just mourn but are forced into 
informal collective organisations outside the trade unions. When this happens it is 
a clear repudiation of the trade unions by the workers.
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The institutionalisation of relations between the trade unions and the employers 
has  resulted  in  the  trade  unions  eschewing  the  new forms  of  organising  that 
recognise  the workers’  status and allow the development  of new associational 
strategies that recognise the potential of symbolic power. The trade unions are, for 
example, adopting strategies that that alienate vulnerable workers such as labour-
brokers and subcontractor  workers.  The trade unions deliberately exclude such 
workers from their  leadership and structures.  It  is  ironic  that  the trade  unions 
lament failure to organise workers in flexible employment and yet adopt strategies 
that exclude them.
It is generally accepted that employers, through their extensive adoption of the 
flexible forms of employment, are the main responsible factor in undermining the 
power of the trade union movement. This study strongly challenges this position 
by suggesting that the trade unions and the government are also partly responsible 
for  weakening  the  labour  movement.  The  trade  unions  have  adopted  policies, 
strategies and collective bargaining agreements that alienate the majority of the 
workforce in the industry. On the other hand, the government is also responsible 
for  the  adoption  and  implementation  of  policies  that  overtly  undermine  the 
structural power of the labour movement.
The use of the traditional and new sources of power is not only confined within 
and for workplace issues as shown in this study. Workers have many identities; 
for example, they are workers and at the same time members of the community. 
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The workers at Nelspruit were able to use their worker associational power not 
only for workplace struggles but also for community struggles. They successfully 
managed to link workplace and community issues, and in the process articulated 
the old sources of power to the new.
In response to the use of associational  power by the workers,  the government 
called  an all-stakeholders  summit  to try to  resolve the problem.  However,  the 
summit ignored the people who were responsible for the strikes in the projects, as 
most of the strikes were not initially caused by the trade unions but by the workers 
themselves  through  some  informal  collective  organisations.  This  can  be  an 
indication of the use of the trade union as a tool to create and sustain stability for 
management.
In conclusion, while this study confirms that there are potential new sources of 
trade  union  power  which  can  be  established  through the  development  of  new 
associational  strategies  that  recognise  the  potential  of  symbolic  power.  This 
however, can only be fully realised if the trade unions in the construction industry 
abandon strategies that alienate the workers outside the core staff who ironically 
constitute the majority in the industry.
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Appendix
List of Interviews
1. Human Resources Manager, Green Point Stadium, Cape Town. 
Interviewed on 24 August 2008 in Johannesburg. 
2. Executive Manager, Collective Bargaining, Department of Labour. 
Interviewed on 11 August 2008 in Johannesburg.
3. Industrial Relations Manager, Green Point Stadium, Cape Town. 
Interviewed on 23 September 2008 in Cape Town.
4. Human Resources Manager Soccer City stadium. Interviewed on 15 
August 2008 in Johannesburg.
5. Senior Commissioner, CCMA. Interviewed on 13 August 2008 in 
Johannesburg.
6. NUM National Co-ordinator Construction. Interviewed on 19 August 2008 
in Johannesburg.
7. BCAWU National Co-ordinator. Interviewed on 26 August 2008 in 
Johannesburg.
8. SAFSEC Industrial Relations Manager. Interviewed on 5 September 2008 
in Johannesburg.
9. Department of Sports and Recreation, Director. Interviewed on15 
September 2008 in Johannesburg.
10. NUM Regional Co-ordinator, Cape Town. Interviewed on 22 September 
2008 in Cape Town.
11. BCAWU National Organiser. Interviewed on 22 September 2008 in Cape 
Town.
12. Executive Manager, Cape of Good Hope Building Bargaining Council. 
Interviewed on 23 September 2008 in Cape Town.
13. BWI 2010 Campaign Co-ordinator. Interviewed on 23 September 2008 in 
Cape Town.
14. Human Resources Manager, Nelspruit Stadium. Interviewed on 28 
October 2008 in Nelspruit.
15. NUM Senior Shop Steward, Soccer City Stadium. Interviewed on 17 
September 2008 in Johannesburg.
16. NUM Shop Steward, Cape Town. Interviewed on 24 September 2008 in 
Cape Town.
17. BCAWU Shop Steward, Cape Town. Interviewed on 24 September 2008 
in Cape Town.
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18. NUM Shop Steward, Nelspruit. Interviewed on 31 October 2008 in 
Nelspruit.
19. NUM Regional Organiser, Nelspruit. Interviewed on 31 October 2008 in 
Nelspruit.
20. BCAWU Senior Shop Steward, Polokwane. Interviewed on 20 August 
2008 in Johannesburg.
21. NUM Shop Steward, Durban. Interviewed on 24 September 2008 in 
Johannesburg.
Focus Groups
1. Ten Construction Industry Workers at Soccer City Stadium in Johannesburg. 
Interviewed on 20 September 2008.
2. Ten Construction Industry Workers at Green Point Stadium in Cape Town. 
Interviewed on 25 September 2008.
3. Eight Construction Industry Workers at Nelspruit Stadium in Nelspruit. 
Interviewed on 29 October 2008.
Selected Meetings and Conferences
1. BCAWU Shop Steward Conference held in Johannesburg on 20 August 
2008.
2. NUM Shop Stewards Workshop held in Johannesburg on 24 October 
2008.
3.  Attended several trade union site meetings at Soccer City, Cape Town 
and Nelspruit stadiums, attended between July 2008 and November 2008.
Documents
1. Soccer City Stadium Grinaker LTA-NUM Recognition Agreement.
2. Department of Sport and Recreation-CCMA s Construction of the 2010 
FIFA World Cup Summit Report 2008.
3. Various collective bargaining agreements accessed from the Department 
of Labour Archives in Pretoria.
4. Trade union documents, memoranda, circulars, notices accessed from the 
NUM and BCAWU records.
115
